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ABSTRACT

THREE ESSAYS ON TRADE POLICY AND FACTOR MOBILITY
Baishali Majumdar

This dissertation consists of three essays on trade policy and factor mobility. The first
essay of the dissertation deals with issues on trade policy. It focuses on the possibility of
recipient immiserization under optimal export taxation in a multi-country framework.
We find asymmetry between two nations is very crucial for recipient immiserization. The
interesting finding is that being more aggressive in taxation is a disadvantage in gaining
from receipts of transfers. The larger exporter exercises more market power and is also
more vulnerable to the adverse welfare effects of transfer.
The second and third essays explore the issues of trade policy as well as factor mobility.
Process of trade liberalization is discussed in both essays. Factor mobility is described in
the form of labor movement. In particular the two essays talk about migration. The
second essay discusses illegal immigration between Mexico and the U.S. and how trade
liberalization affects the flow of illegal immigrants. Results show that trade liberalization
in Mexico reduces the undocumented labor flow from Mexico to the U.S. The focus of
the third essay is on legal immigration to the U.S. from seven different source countries.
We analyze the importance of push factors e.g. low GNP, high unemployment rate and
increasing population for the level of legal immigration. Obviously, the key push factor
is the tariff rate. We find that trade liberalization in the seven source countries impedes
the flow of legal immigration to the U.S. In addition, growing population of the origin
countries is found to stimulate the flow of legal immigration, whereas a higher GDP at
origin reduces the flow of legal immigration.
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Chapter 1
Introduction, Review of the Literature, and
Overview of the Dissertation

This dissertation presents three essays on trade policy and factor mobility. Chapter 1 is
an introductory chapter that gives an overview of the dissertation and also reviews the
related literature. Chapter 2 presents the first essay that deals with issues on trade policy.
It discusses the issue of optimal export taxation and immiserizing transfers1. Chapter 3
and chapter 4 present the second and third essays respectively. Both essays discuss the
linkage between trade policy and factor mobility. The second essay studies the impact of
trade liberalization on illegal immigration.
liberalization affects legal immigration.

The third essay focuses on how trade
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation by

reviewing the conclusions and implications from each essay.

In trade theory, optimal export taxation has traditionally been analyzed in the context of
two-country general equilibrium models. However, in reality several nations export a
particular commodity. For example, nations like Cote d’Ivoire and Brazil export cocoa
and also employ export taxes. Clearly, the world cocoa price is dependent on the tax
policies of each of these exporting nations. Hence the trade polices of the exporting
nations are interdependent and the terms of trade movements for an exporting nation
depends on the existing taxes (or tax policies) of the competing nations.

1

Immiserizing transfer occurs when the welfare level of a nation is worsened due to receipts of transfer
payments.

1

The first essay analyzes the welfare consequences of transfers in the presence of Nash
optimal taxes. In particular, we study the issue of immiserizing transfers. Immiserizing
transfers occur when an induced adverse terms of trade effect on the recipient exceeds the
primary gains of transfer itself. Samuelson (1947) argues that immiserizing transfer can
be ruled out in a two-country framework if the international market equilibrium is stable.
However, Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983) show that the immiserizing transfer
paradox cannot be ruled out in a multi-country context. The presence of a third country
can lead to an amplified adverse terms of trade movement that outweighs the primary
gains of transfers and results in recipient immiserization (consistent with market
stability).

We adopt a three-country (A, B and C) two-good (1 and 2) framework where domestic
consumption of the export good is allowed. Nation A and B export good 1 to nation C
and impose optimal taxes on their export good. Apart from exporting good 1, A and B
also consume good 2. Nation C consumes both goods but produces good 2 only. C
makes transfer payments to A and B. We consider four scenarios. First, can a bilateral
transfer from C to A immiserize A? Second, under an equiproportionate transfer from C
to A and B (where transfers are proportional to the exports of A and B) is recipient
immiserization possible?

Third, can recipient immiserization happen when

equiproportionate transfers are made by C to A and B where transfers are not proportional
to the exports of A and B? Finally if C makes equal transfers to A and B, can it lead to
recipient immiserization? The first essay attempts to answer these questions in a general
equilibrium context.

2

The second and third essays study the linkage between trade policy and factor mobility.
The trade policy issue studied is the process of trade liberalization. Factor mobility
focuses on movement of labor.

The second essay considers the impact of trade

liberalization on illegal immigration. The third essay looks at how trade liberalization
affects the flow of legal immigration.

Ethier (1986) and Bond and Chen (1987) are the pioneers in the literature on illegal
immigration. Migration involves labor movement. Labor movement is different from
capital mobility, as it does not generate in exchange a flow of payments unless wages are
repatriated (see Ethier, 1986).

Ethier (1986) presented a model where he studied several

immigration policies and enforcement measures to reduce the level of illegal immigration.
Bond and Chen (1987) extended Ethier's results by examining the optimal level of
enforcement in a two-country model and also studied the effects of capital mobility.

Our essay builds on the work by Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999a), where they analyze
the factors affecting illegal immigration from Mexico to the United States. The novelty
of our study is to introduce trade liberalization and analyze the impact of trade
liberalization on the undocumented labor flow from Mexico to the United States. The
role of border enforcement in controlling illegal immigration is also discussed. The issue
is addressed here both theoretically and empirically.

In a similar vein the third essay studies the effect of trade liberalization on legal
immigration to the U.S. originating from seven different countries (Canada, El Salvador,

3

India, Korea, Mexico, the Philippines and the United Kingdom). This essay is built on
the push-pull theory of migration. It analyzes push factors such as low GNP, high
unemployment rate, and increasing population in origin countries that force people to
migrate. Obviously, the focus is on the tariff rate of the origin countries and how it
affects the level of legal immigration to the U.S. In the immigration literature there is no
existing study that has empirically analyzed the role of trade liberalization on legal
immigration. This essay attempts to make some contribution by establishing a linkage
between trade liberalization and legal immigration.

4

Chapter 2
The Transfer Paradox in a Multi Country framework

2.1 Introduction

One of the interesting questions in international trade theory is the issue of immiserizing
growth and immiserizing transfer.

Immiserization has been studied and analyzed

extensively in trade theory. Bhagwati (1958) showed that immiserizing growth occurs
when an adverse movement in the terms of trade of the growing country outweighs the
primary gain in the real income due to growth. The issue of immiserizing transfer is
similar to immiserizing growth. Immiserizing transfer or transfer paradox occurs when
the welfare level of a nation is worsened due to receipt of a transfer. This happens as the
adverse movement in the terms of trade offsets the initial gain from the receipts of
transfer.

Samuelson (1947) showed that stability in the international market equilibrium is
sufficient to rule out the transfer paradox (i.e. immiserizing transfer) in a two-country
two-good framework.

One of the most notable works on the transfer issue is by

Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983, henceforth referred to as BBH). They analyze the
transfer problem or immiserizing transfer in a multi-country framework and show that the
paradox of recipient immiserizing transfers cannot be ruled out in a multi-country
framework under free trade. The presence of a non-participant third country creates
conditions that make the transfer paradox possible even in the face of market stability.
5

The presence of the third country can lead to adverse terms of trade effects to be
magnified to such an extent that it outweighs the primary gains from the transfer for the
recipient. If the recipient’s marginal propensity to consume its export good is less than
the donor’s propensity to consume the same good, the transfer will lead to an excess
supply of recipient’s export good and a consequent terms of trade decline. If the nonparticipant is a net exporter of the same good and responds perversely (backward bending
offer curve) to this price decline, then the excess supply becomes larger, leading to an
amplified terms of trade decline, which allows the transfer paradox. The authors further
show that if the two participating countries impose an optimal trade tax vis-à-vis the nonparticipant country then the paradox of immiserization cannot occur. The optimal trade
tax neutralizes the adverse terms of trade effect on welfare and hence the possibility of
immiserization can be ruled out.

The bilateral transfer paradox discussed above and the closely related problem of
immiserizing growth, while being theoretically plausible, are generally regarded as
remote possibilities. In addition, the positive experience of Asian nations in export
expansion does not lend support to immiserization concerns. However, in recent years it
has been recognized that terms of trade concerns are still alive for primary productexporting nations, and there is some evidence suggesting that rapid export expansion by
these nations may be self-defeating.2 Several of these primary product exporting nations
also employ export taxes, which affect terms of trade movements. For example, nations

2

See for example Diakosavvas and Scandizzo (1991), Panagariya and Schiff (1991). For a survey of these
issues see Rodrik (1995).

6

like Cote d’Ivoire and Brazil export cocoa and also employ export taxes. Clearly, the
world cocoa price is dependent on the tax policies of each of these exporting nations.
Thus the trade policies of the exporting nations are interdependent and the terms of trade
movement for an exporting nation depends on the existing taxes (or tax policies) of the
competing nations. Panagariya and Schiff (1995) extended the analysis of trade taxes to a
multicountry setting. They demonstrated that revenue-maximizing Nash taxes might lead
to a higher welfare level than welfare maximizing optimal Nash taxes. Panagariya and
Schiff emphasized the strategic interdependence in a multicountry context. However,
they used partial equilibrium analysis in their model.

Along similar lines,

Bandyopadhyay (1992, 1995 and 1996) employs general equilibrium Nash export
taxation models to show that immiserizing growth and investments are possible in spite
of unilateral export taxation. Recently, Lahiri and Raimondos-Moller (1997a and 1997b)
analyze trade policy in the allocation of foreign aid in a multi country general equilibrium
model. Their analysis shows that if the donor maximizes its own welfare while deciding
on the allocation of aid, and the marginal propensities to consume are the same in the two
recipient countries, then a country with higher tariff will receive a lower share of the
foreign aid than a country with lower tariff. However, the result is just the opposite when
the donor maximizes the collective welfare of the recipient countries.

These

contributions provide a consistent framework within which one can address the concerns
of primary product exporting nations.

In this essay, the transfer problem is analyzed with the help of a general equilibrium
model in a three-country, two-good framework. This multi country setting is consistent

7

with the real world, where aid is given by the multilateral agencies to several primary
product- exporting developing nations. In reality, the nations vary in terms of their
market share and export taxes. Thus we address the issue of asymmetry in analyzing the
effects of transfer. Nations A and B export good 1 to nation C. There is a transfer of
income from nation C to nations A and B. Nation C specializes in the production of
commodity 2. Nations A and B impose optimal tax while C follows free trade.3 This
model differs from Bandyopadhyay (1992) because it incorporates domestic consumption
in exporting nations.

The welfare effect on nation A due to the receipt of transfer payment can be decomposed
into three parts: (a) the direct effect; (b) the indirect effect; and (c) the external effect.
The direct effect is composed of two parts, one is the extra income received from nation
C and the other is the negative terms of trade effect caused by the transfer between A and
C. The indirect effect is the effect of A’s transfers to the tax rate of B. Nation B being
the exporting nation cuts its tax rate in response to a demand reduction of good 1 in the
post transfer case, assuming a relatively high propensity to consume for nation C.4 Hence,
this indirect effect is likely to be negative. Third is the external effect i.e., the effect of
the transfer to B on A's welfare. This is the adverse terms of trade externality created on
A by C's gift to B. This external effect is absent in the case of a bilateral transfer where B
receives no transfer payment. A-priori it is impossible to know the sign of the total
3

This is a reasonable assumption since developed countries are unlikely to retaliate to export taxes on
primary products exported primarily by developing nations.
4
Good 1 is consumed by all the three nations. In the post transfer situation if the marginal propensity to
consume of C (now with a lower income) is higher than that of B then there is a reduction in net demand of
good 1.

8

effect. Hence we need to analyze in detail the bilateral and the multilateral case.
First, consider a bilateral transfer (where C makes a transfer to A), where we have the
direct and indirect effects of transfer. As discussed above, the indirect effect is likely to
be negative. Hence, the sign of the total welfare effect of nation A hinges on the sign and
magnitude of the direct effect. We obtain the condition that inelastic offer curve for the
nonparticipant (nonrecipient) nation is necessary for the direct effect to be negative (i.e.
immiserization of A). This is similar to the condition discussed by BBH under free trade.
We further show that immiserization is likely to occur when the recipient has a higher tax
rate than the non-participant. Inferiority of the importable in the consumption of the
donor is also identified as a condition for immiserization.

Next, we analyze the case of multilateral transfer. Three scenarios are considered. First,
we consider equiproportionate multilateral transfer and show that transfers proportional to
the exports of the recipient nations cannot immiserize either of the recipient nations
provided the tax response of B is sufficiently small. This ensures that the negative
indirect effect is small, and is outweighed by the positive direct and external effects
combined together. This finding shows that the BBH (1983) result  that
equiproportionate (transfers proportional to the exports) multilateral transfer under free
trade cannot immiserize the recipients  can be extended to optimal taxation. Next, we
consider equiproportionate multilateral transfer where the proportions are not equal to the
exports of the recipient nations. We demonstrate that nation A is likely to be immiserized
provided it receives a smaller share of the transfer and marginal propensity to consume
good 1 by C (i.e.g1M)> marginal propensity to consume good 1 by B (i.e.mpc1B). Finally,

9

we show that when equal transfers are made to the exporting nation, then the nation with
the higher optimal tax rate is likely to be immiserized. Here, the issue of asymmetry
between exporting nations becomes crucial in analyzing the effects of transfer.

2.2 The Model with Nash Welfare Maximizing Taxes
Let us consider a general equilibrium model where there are three countries: A, B and C;
and two goods: 1 and 2. Nations A and B not only export good 1 to nation C but also
consume it domestically. C makes transfers gA and gB to A and B, respectively. C
consumes both goods but is specialized in producing good 2. A and B impose taxes tA
and tB, respectively, while C follows free trade.

Let the expenditure functions of nation A, B and C be EA(p1(1-tA),1,UA),
EB(p1(1-tB),1,UB) and EC(p1,1,UC) respectively where UA, UB and UC are the three nations
utilities. Let good 2 be the numeraire good and the price of good 1 is denoted by p1.
RA(p1(1-tA),1) and RB(p1(1-tB),1) are the respective revenue functions, E1A(.), E1B(.) and
E1C(p1,1,UC) are the three countries’ demand functions and R1A(.) and R1B(.) are the
respective supply functions. The following equations describe trade equilibrium in this
general equilibrium framework.
EA(p1(1-tA),1,UA) = RA(p1(1-tA),1) + tAp1(R1A –E1A) + gA

(2.1)

EB(p1(1-tB),1,UB) = RB(p1(1-tB),1) + tBp1(R1B –E1B) + gB

(2.2)

R1A(.)+ R1B(.) = E1A(.)+ E1B(.)+ E1C(p1,1,UC)

(2.3)

The general equilibrium demand for good 1 by country C is defined as:

10

ϕ1(p1,1, gA, gB)=E1C(p1,1,UC)=g1(p1,1, M)=g1(p1,1, RC(p1,1)- gA-gB)=g1(p1,1, X 2 - gA- gB)5
where g1(p1,1,M) is the Marshallian demand for good 1 in nation C and M represents the
national income of nation C. Since nation C is completely specialized in good 2, its
national income M equals X 2 - gA - gB, where X 2 is the maximum output of good 2 that
C can produce, given its resources and technology. Equation (2.1) implicitly defines UA
as a function of p1, tA, gA. Similarly equation (2.2) implicitly defines UB as a function of
p1,tB, gB.
UA = UA(p1,tA, gA)

(2.4)

UB = UB(p1,tB, gB)

(2.5)

Using the implicit functions (2.4) and (2.5) in (2.3) we have:
R1A(p1(1-tA),1) + R1B(p1(1-tB),1) - E1A(p1(1-tA),1, UA)
- E1B (p1(1-tB),1, UB)- ϕ1(p1,1, gA, gB) = 0

(2.6)

Equation (2.6) is the market clearing equation that implicitly defines p1 as a function of
tA, tB ,gA, gB.
p1 = p1(tA, tB ,gA, gB)

(2.6’)

The tax policies of the two nations are obtained from the Nash optimal tax rules which
maximize the welfare levels of each nation with respective to their tax rates given the tax
rate of the other nation.
Differentiating (2.4) and using (2.6') we have the Nash optimal tax rule for nation A as:

∂ UA/ ∂ tA = U1Ap11 + U2A = 0

(2.7)

5

Note, ϕ13 = ϕ14 = -g1M i.e. the effect of the transfer payment on the general equilibrium demand of nation C
is the negative of nation C’s income effect on its Marshallian demand function (i.e. nation C’s marginal
propensity to consume good 1)

11

The tax rule for country B is:

∂ UB/ ∂ tB = U1Bp12 + U2B = 0

(2.8)

(2.7) implies tA = tA( gA, gB)

(2.7’)

(2.8) implies tB = tB( gA, gB)

(2.8')

Equations (2.1), (2.2), (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) describe the general equilibrium system
which solves for UA, UB, tA, tB and p1.

2.3 Some Useful Welfare and Price Effects
Using equations (2.1) and (2.4) we can derive:
U1A =

R1A − E1A + t A p1 (1 − t A )( R11A − E11A )
EUA + t A p1 E1AU

(2.4a)

The term U1A gives the effect of p1 on the welfare level of A. To determine the sign of
the expression we have to consider the numerator and the denominator separately. The
denominator is positive under normality of good 1. The numerator can be decomposed
into two parts (a) R1A – E1A denoting excess supply of good 1, hence positive since nation
A is a net exporter of good 1 (b) tAp1 (1- tA)(R11A – E11A). Now, the slope of the excess
supply function given by R11A-E11A is positive from the convexity of the R(.) and the
concavity of the E(.) functions. Hence, the effect of p1 on the welfare of nation A is
positive. The intuition is that good 1 being the export good for nation A, the increase
(decrease) in its price raises (reduces) the welfare level of nation A. Similarly,
2

U2

A

t p ( E11A − R11A )
= A A1
<0
EU + t A p1 E1AU

(2.4b)
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U3A =

1
>0
E + t A p1 E1AU

(2.4c)

A
U

Equation (2.4b) suggests that an increase in its own tax rate leads to a reduction in the
welfare level, because of the production and consumption distortion. Equation (2.4c)
captures the direct income effect on A due to the receipt of gA, which raises its welfare.
Compiling (2.4a), (2.4b) and (2.4c), we have
U1A = [Exp1A + tAp1(1-tA)(R11A-E11A)] U3A
U2A = tAp12(R11A-E11A) U3A
The effects of nation A’s tax rate, nation B’s tax rate, nation A’s transfer payment and
nation B’s transfer payment on the price level are given by p11, p12, p13 and p14
respectively. The expressions can be derived from (2.6) as:

p1 ( R11A − E11A ) EUA
1
.
p11 =
A
A
MLC
EU +t A p1 E1U
p12 =

p1 ( R11B − E11B ) EUB
B
U

E +t B p1 E

B
1U

.

(2.6a)

1
MLC

(2.6b)

E1AU U 3A − g 1M
E1AU U 3A + φ13
=
p13 =
MLC
MLC

(2.6c)

E1BU U 3B + φ14
E1BU U 3B − g 1M
=
p14 =
MLC
MLC

(2.6d)

where MLC is the slope of the global excess supply function.
MLC = R11A(1-tA) + R11B(1-tB)- E11A(1-tA)– E1UAU1A – E11B (1-tB) – E1UBU1B – ϕ11 >0
from Marshall Lerner condition for stability of international equilibrium.
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2.4 The Case of Bilateral Transfers
Set dgB = 0
Differentiating (2.4) and using (2.6') and (2.7), we have the welfare effect for nation A:
dUA = U1Ap12dtB + (U1Ap13dgA + U3A)dgA

(2.9)

Note: Here the first term on the right-hand side denotes the indirect effect and combining
the second and the third term we have the direct effect.
dUA / dgA = U1Ap12dtB/ dgA + (U1Ap13+ U3A)
As mentioned before, dtB/ dgA <0
The optimal tax rule of A can be rewritten as:
U1A = tAp1MLC/EUA

(2.10)

Using (2.6b) and (2.10) we have:

t A p12 ( R11B − E11B ) EUB
U1 p12=
>0
( EUB +t B p1 E1BU ) EUA
A

⇒ U1Ap12 dtB/ dgA <0

(2.11)

Therefore, dUA/ dgA is likely to be negative if U1Ap13+ U3A <0.
Using (2.10) and (2.6c) we have:
U1Ap13+ U3A =

1 − t A p1 g 1M
EUA

(2.12)

Thus immiserization might occur if 1- tAp1g1M <0
The optimal tax rule of A in (2.7) can be rewritten as:
Exp1A = tAp1[ ε 1 -E11C +g1g1M]
B

(2.13)
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ε 1B = (1- tB) )(R11B-E11B) – E1UBU1B is the slope of the

where, Exp1A = exports of A and
excess export supply for nation B.

Similarly, the optimal tax rule of B:
Exp1B = tBp1[ ε 1 -E11C +g1g1M]
A

where, Exp1B = exports of B and

(2.14)

ε 1A is the slope of the excess export supply for nation A.

Consider, Exp1A + Exp1B = g1 = tAp1g1g1M + tAp1[ ε 1 -E11C] + tBp1[ ε 1 -E11C +g1g1M ]
B

A

Hence, g1[1- tAp1g1M] = tAp1[ ε1 -E11C] + tBp1[ ε1 -E11C +g1g1M ]
A

B

= tAp1[ ε1 -E11C] + tBp1 Exp1B
B

(2.15)

We know Exp1B >0 and E11C <0. Therefore, the negativity of

ε1B is a necessary condition

for the occurrence of immiserization.
Equation (2.15) can be rewritten as:
g1[1- tAp1g1M] = p1 ε 1B [ tA- tB ]- tAp1 E11C + tBp1MLC
where MLC =
Consider,
Case 1:

(2.16)

ε 1A + ε 1B - E11C +g1g1M

ε 1B <0
tA ≤ tB

[1- tAp1g1M ]>0 since E11C <0 and MLC>0. Therefore, immiserization is not possible.
Case 2:

tA>tB

In this case the first term on the right hand side of the final expression is negative and the
remaining terms are positive. Therefore, we cannot rule out immiserization of A if it is
the nation with a higher tax.
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Note: Here immiserization occurs when 1-tAp1g1M <0. This implies tAp1g1M >1 i.e.
p1g1M >1 since 0< tA<1.
We know from Engel's law, p1 g1(p1, 1, M) + g2(p1, 1, M) = M
Therefore, p1g1M + g2M = 1
p1g1M>1 iff g2M < 0 i.e. inferiority of good 2 is necessary for the outcome of transfer
immiserization for nation A.

PROPOSITION 1
Necessary conditions for recipient immiserization are that the non-participant nation’s
offer curve is backward bending and good 2 is inferior in consumption for nation C.
Immiserization cannot be ruled out if the recipient’s tax rate exceeds that of the nonparticipant.
Proof and Comment
The proof follows from the above discussion. Backward bending supply curve implies
that the supply of export good rises as relative price falls. Hence due to transfer as soon
as the price of good 1 falls, nation B increases the supply due to its backward bending
offer curve, which reinforces the price fall and results in immiserization. However, a
high tax rate of B arrests this perverse price response and rules out immiserization.

When good 2 is inferior in consumption for nation C, good 1 shows large income effects.
This results in a large terms of trade deterioration for nation A and B while nation C loses
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income in the transfer process. Nation B enjoys a free ride on the high tax rates imposed
by nation A and is able to retain most of its gain, whereas nation A suffers a welfare loss.

2.5 The Case of Multilateral Transfers
In this case the welfare effect for nation A is given as:
dUA = U1Ap12dtB + (U1Ap13 + U3A )dgA + U1Ap14dgB

(2.17)

Note: Here we have the external effect of transfer (i.e. U1Ap14dgB) which is the effect of
transfer to B on A's welfare.
Using (2.12) we can rewrite (2.17) as:

1 − t A p1 g 1M
dgA + U1Ap12dtB + U1Ap14 dgB
dU =
A
EU
A

(2.18)

Let dg be the total transfer made by C to A and B. Let α be the fraction going to A.
Consider transfers to be proportional to the exports of the two nations then the paradox
can be ruled when nation B's tax response is sufficiently small.
Exp1A
Exp1B
Exp1A
Hence, dgA=
dg; dgB=
dg and assume dtB/dg is
dg =
g1
g1
Exp1A + Exp1B
sufficiently small.
Hence (2.18) reduces to:
B

B

B

t p (1 − t B )( R11 − E11 ) EU
dU /dg = AA 1 [
- E11C ] + U1Ap12dtB/dg >0
EUB + t B p1 E1BU
EU g 1
A

since, U1Ap12>0
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(2.19)

PROPOSITION 2
Multilateral transfers made in proportion to the exports of the two exporting nations must
raise A’s welfare, provided nation B has a sufficiently small tax response.

PROOF AND COMMENT
(2.19) provides the proof. We have run extensive simulations and in all of them the tax
response (dtB) is sufficiently small. The only possible losses in this scenario are caused
by the adverse externality created by the other nation due to its receipts of transfer
payment and, as we have shown above, when transfers are proportional to the exports of
the recipient nations, this externality is not strong enough to outweigh the primary gains
from transfers. This finding extends the BBH result that equiproportionate transfers
cannot immiserize under free trade to the case of export taxation.

Now consider equiproportionate transfers that are not proportional to the exports of the
recipient nations.
Hence, dgA= αdg and dgB= (1-α)dg
Simplifying (2.17) we get:

1 − t A p1 g 1M
α+ U1Ap14(1-α) + U1Ap12dtB/dg
dU /dg =
A
EU
A

(2.20)

According to our argument made before U1Ap12dtB/dg is likely to be negative. Clearly, if
α is small, then a multilateral transfer is likely to immiserize nation A if p14 is negative
i.e. p1 falls due to the receipt of transfer by B.
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This happens when B’s marginal

propensity to consume good 1 (mpc1B) is less than that of C (g1M). The intuition is
provided in the proof and comment of this proposition.

PROPOSITION 3
Multilateral transfers which are not proportional to the exports of the recipient nations are
likely to reduce the welfare of nation A, provided A receives a smaller share of the total
transfer and g1M> mpc1B.

PROOF AND COMMENT
When C makes transfer to B, it ends up with lower income. Hence, C demands less of
good 1. However, good 1 is also consumed by nation B, which has a higher income due
to the receipts of transfer. It is obvious if nation C’s marginal propensity to consume
(g1M) is greater than that of B (mpc1B) then post transfer net demand for good 1 falls,
hence the price of good 1 itself falls. Nation A being the exporter of good 1 gets hurt in
this process. The assumption g1M> mpc1B is consistent with the real world situation of
cocoa where domestic consumption in the exporting nation is not so significant.

Now consider equal transfer where dgA = dgB =dg and (2.17) becomes:
dUA /dg = U1Ap13 + U1Ap14 + U3A + U1Ap12dtB/dg
Using (2.12) we can rewrite (2.21) as:
dUA /dg =

1 − t A p1 g1M
+ U1Ap14+ U1Ap12dtB/dg
EUA
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(2.21)

It can be shown that

=

1 − t A p1 g1M
+ U1Ap14
A
EU

t A p1
t
t
[U3B E1BU Exp1A - E11C +(1-tB)( R11B - E11B ) EUB U3B+ B ( ε 1A - E11C )+( B -1)g1g1M]>0
A
tA
tA
g 1 EU

(2.22)
provided ε 1A >0 and tB> tA where U3B =

1
EUB + t B p1 E1BU

Notice that: ε 1A = (1-tA) ( R11A - E11A ) - E1AU U1A . In the absence of consumption of good-1 in
the exporting nations as assumed in Panagariya-Schiff (1991 and 1995), E1AU =0, and ε 1A
is strictly positive. As long as E1AU is small, ε 1A (i.e., the slope of the export supply curve
of A) is likely to be positive. This implies that for a sufficiently small tax response of
nation B,
dUA /dg =

1 − t A p1 g1M
+ U1Ap14+ U1Ap12dtB/dg >0
EUA

PROPOSITION 4
When an equal multilateral transfer is made to the two exporting nations then for a
sufficiently small tax response of nation B, nation A cannot be immiserized provided tB>
tA. On the other hand if tA> tB, then A can be immiserized.

PROOF AND COMMENT
We have provided simulation examples that establish nation A may be immiserized if
tA>tB. Note that a larger exporter is likely to have a higher export tax because it faces a
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less elastic residual demand curve. Thus proposition 4 suggests that the larger exporter is
more vulnerable to immiserization through multilateral transfers. This is related to
Bandyopadhyay’s (1996) finding that larger exporting nations with higher Nash welfare
maximizing export taxes are more vulnerable to immiserizing growth. The reason behind
these findings derives from the public good property of the export tax imposed by a
nation. The smaller exporting nations free rides on the high export tax imposed by the
larger exporter and, thereby, do not adequately restrict exports (from the point of view of
the larger exporter). Thus, adverse terms of trade movements can be significant enough
in a multicountry context to lead to immiserization of the larger exporter.

2.6 Conclusion
The issue of transfers has been extensively analyzed in international trade theory.
However, there has been very little work dealing with the connections between export
taxation, welfare effects of transfers, and asymmetry between the recipients. This essay
discusses some of these important issues. The analysis shows the importance of
asymmetry in analyzing interdependence in a multi country framework. Being more
aggressive in taxation is a disadvantage in terms of gaining from the receipts of transfer.
The larger exporter exercises more market power and is also more vulnerable to the
adverse welfare effects of transfer. Welfare effects of transfer are analyzed in both
bilateral and multilateral scenarios. In the bilateral case, the necessary conditions for
immiserization are very stringent. Thus, in reality, immiserization is unlikely to happen.
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However, this is not true in the multilateral case, where the simulation results strongly
support the possibility of immiserization through equal and proportionate transfers.
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2.7 Simulation Results Supporting Multilateral Transfer
In this section, simulation examples are presented supporting propositions 2, 3 and 4. We
have run extensive simulations using GAMS to establish the propositions discussed in the
multilateral transfer. For a better understanding, we present the simulation results in a
tabular form for proposition 4. We start with the functional forms of the revenue,
expenditure and utility functions.

THE RELEVANT FUNCTIONAL FORMS
(a)

Revenue Function

We assume Cobb-Douglas production functions for the two goods in order to derive the
revenue functions.
Let the production functions for good 1 and 2 be:
X1 = LaK1-a and X2 = LbK1-b
Therefore, the revenue function of nation i is:
Ri(p1, p2;N,K) = N B1s1 B2s2 p1-s1 p2-s2 + K B1s3 B2s4 p1-s3 p2-s4
where s1= (b-1)/(a-b); s2 = (1-a)/(a-b); s3 = b/(a-b) ; s4 = -a/(a-b)
Hence the revenue function for nation A is:
RA(p1(1-tA),1) = NAB1s1 B2s2 p1A-s1 + K AB1s3 B2s4 p1A-s3 , where p1A = p1(1-tA)
Revenue function for nation B is:
RB(p1(1-tB),1) = NBB1s1 B2s2 p1A-s1 + KBB1s3 B2s4 p1A-s3 , where p1B = p1(1-tB)

(b)

Expenditure Function
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The utility functions assumed here are also Cobb-Douglas, which lead to our specific
expenditure functions.
U = C1αC 21-α
Hence, the expenditure function is:
E (p1, p2,U) = p1C1 + p2C2 = (1-α)α-1α-α p1α p21-α U
The expenditure function for nation A is:
EA (p1(1-tA),1,UA) = (1-α)α-1α-α [p1 (1-tA)]α UA
Similarly, the expenditure function for nation B is:
EB (p1(1-tB),1,UB) = (1-α)α-1α-α [p1 (1-tB)]α UB

(c)

Demand function for good 1 by nation C

The utility function for nation C postulated here is an addilog utility function that
generates strong income effects. This helps the occurrence of immiserization.
Let the indirect utility function of the donor nation be an addilog function of the form:
v(p1, p2,y) = (y/ p1)z1 + (y/ p2)z2
Hence the Marshallian demand function for good 1 is of the form:
g1(p1, p2,y) = yz1p1-(1+z1)z1/((yz1-1 p1-z1z1 + yz2-1 p1-z2z2)
The income for the donor nation is y = p2X2∗ where X2∗ = (N∗)b(K∗)1-b
where N∗ and K∗ are the labor and capital endowments of the donor nation. Since good 2
is the numeraire commodity, the price of good 2 is unity. Hence the general equilibrium
demand function for good 1 by nation C is:
ϕ1(p1, 1) = yz1p1-(1+z1)z1/((yz1-1 p1-z1z1 + yz2-1 z2)
The parameter configurations used in all the examples are:
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α = 0.1, a = 0.7, b= 0.2, z1= 2.0, z2=1.0, s1= -1.6, s2=0.6, s3=0.4, s4=-1.4 and y=2000.

PROPOSITION 2: SIMULATION EXAMPLE
In this example, equiproportionate (proportional to the exports) transfers are made to
nations A and B in the amounts of 0.702 and 0.298. The labor endowments of A and B
are 9000 and 1000, respectively, and the capital endowments of the two nations are 5000
and 800. The optimal Nash tax rates of nation A and B are 0.48683746 and 0.06000518,
respectively, in the pre-transfer case. The welfare level of nation A is 4974.269. When
nation C makes an equiproportionate transfer to both the nations, the welfare level of
nation A rises to 4974.439 and the tax rate of nation B falls to 0.05998841. The fall of
the tax rate of nation B is 0.00001677, which can be considered as a very small tax
response by nation B. If we consider equation (17) in our paper, the first term on the right
hand side, U 1A p12 dt B captures the tax response of nation B that explains only 3.69% of
the welfare increase. Thus, the tax response of nation B, even though negative, has a very
small effect in the total welfare effect of nation A, leading to an increase in its welfare.
This supports proposition 2.

PROPOSITION 3: SIMULATION RESULTS
In this example proportional (not proportional to the exports) transfers are made to
nations A and B in the amounts of 0.2 and 0.8. Note here that A receives a smaller share
of transfer than B. The labor endowments of A and B are 9000 and 1000, respectively,
and the capital endowments of the two nations are 5000 and 800. The welfare level of
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nation A in the pre-transfer case is 4974.269. In the post-transfer case the welfare of A
falls to 4974.074. Also notice g1M=0.9033>mpc1B=0.0961. This supports proposition 3.

PROPOSITION 4: SIMULATION RESULTS

NA

UA(0)

UA(1)

dUA

UB(0)

UB(1)

dUB

tA0

tB0

tA0/ tB0

Exp1A/g1

5220

4386.574

4386.576

0.002

391.5045

391.9976

0.4931

0.5225

0.0738

7.0774

0.6486

5240

4391.219

4391.220

0.001

391.0273

391.5208

0.4935

0.5230

0.0736

7.1037

0.6491

5243

4391.914

4391.915

0.001

390.9559

391.4495

0.4936

0.5231

0.0736

7.1076

0.6492

5260

4395.849

4395.849

0

390.5526

391.0466

0.4940

0.5235

0.0734

7.1299

0.6496

5279

4400.235

4400.235

0

390.1041

390.5984

0.4943

0.5240

0.0732

7.1548

0.6500

5280

4400.466

4400.465

-0.001

390.0806

390.5749

0.4943

0.5240

0.0732

7.1561

0.6501

5300

4405.069

4405.068

-0.001

389.6111

390.1057

0.4946

0.5245

0.0730

7.1823

0.6506

5320

4409.658

4409.656

-0.002

389.1440

389.6390

0.4950

0.5251

0.0728

7.2084

0.6510

In this table tA0 and tB0 represent the tax rates of nation A and B in the pre-transfer
situation, UB(0) is the welfare of nation B prior to the receipt of the transfer , UB(1) is its
welfare level after it receives the transfer payment of one unit of good 2 and dUB is the
change in its welfare level. The other terms have their usual meanings as described in the
previous table. This table clearly shows that as tA/ tB increases with the increase in the
labor endowment of A, this nation becomes a relatively large exporter of good 1 and the
effect of immiserization becomes more pronounced. Here transfers received by both
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nations are one unit of good 2. The capital endowments of the two nations are 5000 and
100 and the labor endowment of nation B is 500. The table supports proposition 4, which
states that when nation A has more market power i.e. tA>tB, it can be immiserized. Also
notice that this table shows that dUB is positive throughout. This is consistent with
proposition 4, which states that the nation with the smaller tax rate cannot be
immiserized.
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2.8 Mathematical Derivations Supporting the Text
(1)

Deriving equation-(2.10) of the text:

Recall the optimal tax rule for nation A in equation (2.7):
U1Ap11 + U2A = 0
⇒ U1

A

p1 ( R11A − E11A ) EUAU 3A
+ U2A =0
MLC

Substituting for U2A we get:
U1

A

p1 ( R11A − E11A ) EUAU 3A
+ tA p12 ( E11A − R11A ) U 3A = 0 (substituting for U2A )
MLC

EUA
- t A p1 ] = 0
⇒ p1( R − E ) U [U1
MLC
A
11

A
11

A
3

A

EUA
- t A p1 = 0
⇒ U1
MLC
A

Hence U1A =

(2)

t A p1 MLC
EUA

Deriving equation-(2.13) of the text:

Equating (2.4a) and (2.10) we get:

R1A − E1A + t A p1 (1 − t A )( R11A − E11A ) t A p1 MLC
=
EUA + t A p1 E1AU
EUA
⇒ Exp1A + tAp1 (1-tA)( R11A − E11A ) = (1+ tAp1 mpc1A) tAp1 MLC
where mpc1A= E1UA/ EUA
⇒ Exp1A + tAp1 [(1-tA)( R11A − E11A ) -MLC - tAp1 MLC mpc1A]=0
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Substituting the value of MLC from the text we have:
⇒ Exp1A + tAp1[E1UAU1A –(1-tB)( R11B- E11B ) + E1UBU1B + E11C -g1g1M - tAp1 MLC
mpc1A]=0
Using equation (2.10) we get:
Exp1A = tAp1[ ε 1 -E11C +g1g1M]
B

(3)

Deriving equation-(2.19) of the text:

Under proportional transfer, using (2.6d) and (2.12), (2.18) can be rewritten as:

(1 − t A p1 g1M ) Exp1A
t A p1
Exp1B
B
B
U
E
dg
+
[
-g
]
dg+ U1Ap12dtB
dU =
1M
3
1U
A
A
EU g1
g1
EU
A

Recall from (2.13):
Exp1A = tAp1[ ε 1 -E11C +g1g1M]
B

⇒ Exp1A (1- tAp1 g1M) = tAp1 ( ε 1 -E11C + Exp1 g1M)
B

B

Hence (2.18) becomes,
dUA /dg = [tAp1 ( ε 1 -E11C + Exp1 g1M)]/ EUAg1 + [tAp1 ( E1U
B

B

B

U1Ap12dtB
B
= [ tAp1 ( ε 1 -E11C + Exp1 E1U

B

Now consider,
where,

B

U 3B )]/ EUAg1 + U1Ap12dtB

ε 1B + Exp1B E1BU U 3B

ε 1B = (1- tB) )(R11B-E11B) – E1UBU1B
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U 3B -g1M)] /EUAg1 +

and U1B = [Exp1B + tBp1(1-tB)(R11B-E11B)] U3B
Hence,

ε 1B + Exp1B E1BU U 3B
B

= (1-tB)(R11 -E11

= (1-tB)(R11B-E11B)[1- tBp1E1UBU3B]

(1 − t B )( R11B − E11B ) E1BU
)- tBp1 (
)
EUB +t B p1 E1BU

B

(1 − t B )( R11B − E11B ) EUB
=
>0
EUB +t B p1 E1BU
(1 − t B )( R11B − E11B ) EUB
-E11C )] EUAg1 + U1Ap12dtB>0
This implies, dU /dg = [tAp1 (
B
B
EU +t B p1 E1U
A

provided the tax response of B is sufficiently small.

(4)

Deriving equation-(2.22):

Under optimal taxation and equal transfer:
dUA /dg =

1 − t A p1 g1M
+ U1Ap14+ U1Ap12dtB/dg
A
EU

Now, U1Ap14+

=

(1 − t A p1 g 1M ) U 1A ( E1BU U 3B − g 1M ) (1 − t A p1 g 1M )
=
+
MLC
EUA
EUA

t A p1 ( E1BU U 3B − g 1M ) (1 − t A p1 g 1M )
+
EUA
EUA

E1BU U 3B − g 1M
Since, p14=
from (2.6d)
MLC
Now the numerator of the expression can be rewritten as:
tAp1(

mpc1B
-g1M) + 1- tAp1g1M
1 + t B mpc1B

Using ϕ11 = E11C - g1g1M and Exp1A = tAp1( ε 1B - ϕ11 ), it can be shown that:
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t A p1 (ε 1B − E11C ) + Exp1B
1- tAp1g1M =
g1
Hence, tAp1(

mpc1B
-g1M) + 1- tAp1g1M
1 + t B mpc1B

t A p1
Exp1B
mpc1B g 1
B
C
- g1g1M + ε 1 − E11 +
[
]
=
g 1 1 + t B mpc1B
t A p1
Consider,

Exp1B
mpc1B g 1
- g1g1M + ε 1B − E11C +
t A p1
1 + t B mpc1B

= U 3B E1BU ( Exp1A + Exp1B ) - g1g1M + ε 1B − E11C +

Exp1B
t A p1

Note: mpc1B = E1BU / EUB
Now,

ε 1B = (1- tB) )(R11B-E11B) – E1UBU1B and U1B =

[Exp1B + tBp1(1-tB)(R11B-E11B)] U3B

Hence, U 3B E1BU Exp1B + ε 1B = (1-tB) ( R11B - E11B ) EUB U 3B
From the optimal tax rule of B:
Exp1B = tBp1( ε 1A - ϕ11 )

Hence the numerator of expression (2.22)
tAp1(

Exp1B
mpc1B
mpc1B g 1
-g1M) + 1- tAp1g1M =
- g1g1M + ε 1B − E11C +
t A p1
1 + t B mpc1B
1 + t B mpc1B

= U 3B E1BU Exp1A - E11C +(1-tB) ( R11B - E11B ) EUB U 3B +

tB
t
( ε 1A - E11C )+ ( B -1) g1g1M
tA
tA

Thus we have (2.22):
U1Ap14+

(1 − t A p1 g 1M )
t A p1 ( E1BU U 3B − g 1M ) (1 − t A p1 g 1M )
=
+
EUA
EUA
EUA
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=

t A p1
tB
tB
B
B
B
B
C
B
B
A
C
A
[
U
E
Exp
E
+(1-t
)
(
R
E
)
E
U
+
ε
E
)+
(
(
-1) g1g1M ]
B
1
3
1
U
1
11
11
11
3
11
U
tA
tA
g 1 EUA
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Chapter 3
Trade Liberalization and Illegal Immigration between
Mexico and the United States
3.1 Introduction

Trade liberalization has gained considerable attention globally in the past couple of
decades. The European Community (EC) and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA) were pioneers, and were formed to reduce internal tariffs for all products over a
specific period. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was intended to
liberalize trade among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico. In fact, between 1985 and 1989,
the U.S. and Mexico had signed three major trade agreements, but NAFTA was definitely
the beginning of a new era.

NAFTA was signed by the governments of the United States, Mexico, and Canada on
December 17, 1992. It took effect on January 1, 1994 with the objective of reduction and
eventual elimination of trade and investment barriers within North America. The main
provision of NAFTA was the elimination of all import tariffs on manufactured and
agricultural products traded among the three countries. Some tariffs were eliminated as
soon as the agreement became effective, while others were to be phased out over 5, 10, or
15 years6.

6

Hufbauer and Schott(1993) discuss the particulars of these phase -out schedules.
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Many economists argue that the effects of NAFTA on the undocumented labor flow from
Mexico to the U.S. will not be visible until ten years after the act went into effect. The
undocumented labor flow from Mexico constitutes about one-third of the total illegal
immigration to the U.S. This is the rationale behind studying the impact on illegal
immigration only from Mexico. Also, the focus is on trade liberalization over a period of
the last 25-30 years rather than the post-NAFTA period. This is because NAFTA is likely
to have a less significant impact on illegal immigration in less than a decade. However,
tariff liberalization that these countries have witnessed for the last two decades may have
a more pronounced effect on the undocumented labor flow form Mexico to the United
States.

According to Espenshade (1995) the study of this undocumented labor flow is a very
difficult issue, since it is unobserved and hence the figure estimated is imprecise. The
most popular proxy used to measure illegal immigration is the number of people
apprehended at the U.S. border. Espenshade (1995) also suggests that the correlation
between the number of apprehensions and the estimated level of illegal immigrants is
0.90. This study attempts to capture the effects of trade liberalization on the number of
people apprehended at the border for the period 1970-1998.

The essay is composed of ten sections. Section 3.2 and 3.3 present the issue of illegal
immigration. Section 3.4 discusses the concept of trade liberalization, particularly in the
context of NAFTA. The linkages between illegal immigration and trade liberalization are
discussed in section 3.5. A theoretical model of illegal immigration is presented in section
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3.6. Sections 3.7, 3.8 and & 3.9 discuss the empirical model, the data and the estimation
results. Finally, section 3.10 presents the conclusion of the paper.

3.2 Illegal Immigration: The Policy Debate

Immigration has been an issue of major political debate in the United States for decades.
On one hand, organizations like the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)
argue that immigration is causing too much strain on the U.S. labor market and hence
should be controlled rigorously. Economists are of the opinion that the illegal workers
displace unskilled or low-skilled native workers from their jobs and also put downward
pressure on wages (Greenwood and McDowell, 1986).

Illegal immigrants are also

believed to reduce the pace of structural adjustment and technological progress and thus
retard the economy's competitiveness in the international market (Harrison, 1992). It is
argued that illegal workers draw benefits from U.S. social programs without making
equivalent contribution to the programs' budgets.

At the other extreme there are

proponents advocating immigration. On July 3, 1986, the Wall Street Journal proposed
"there shall be open borders" that was again republished in an editorial on July 3, 1990.
Julian Simon (1981) argues, "admitting immigrants improves our standard of living".
There are other proponents advocating the need for illegal immigrants, who argue that
low-skilled foreign workers are beneficial for the economy. Especially the agricultural
sector of Southern California and Texas and garment industries of big cities like New
York and Los Angeles require cheap labor. Espenshade (1995) argues that there is very
little evidence that illegal immigrants have adverse labor market impacts.
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Due to the overwhelming number of immigrants to the U.S. in recent years, this issue has
gained considerable attention. One of the pioneering works in the field of illegal
immigration is by Ethier (1986). Ethier studied the implications of several immigration
policies and enforcement measures for the level of welfare and distribution of income in
the host country. Bond and Chen (1987) extended Ethier's results by examining the
optimal level of enforcement in a two-country model, and also studied the effects of
capital mobility.

Aliens or non-U.S. citizens can be broadly classified into three categories: (1) immigrants
(people who have been granted permits that allow them to live and work in the United
States permanently); (2) nonimmigrants, (people who are granted temporary visas to the
U.S. to visit, work or study); and (3) illegal immigrants (those without any legal permits).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has the responsibility of enforcing
immigration laws in the U.S. The most difficult tasks that the INS has to perform are to
locate individuals who successfully complete an illegal entry; and aliens who have
entered the country legally but have lost their legal status; and also to arrest individuals at
the border (Statistical Yearbook of the INS, 1999).

The U.S. government has been actively taking action to control the number of illegal
immigrants for more than a decade. The Immigration and Reform Control Act (IRCA) of
1986 and the Immigration Act of 1990 were two major policies in this direction. IRCA
was implemented in 1987, authorizing increased resources to curb illegal immigration
and also raising sanctions on employers hiring illegal aliens.
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There are mixed opinions about the impact of IRCA on illegal immigration. There has
been a decline in the number of illegal immigrants in the post-IRCA period after
controlling for factors like wages and unemployment level that can affect illegal
immigration.

This made Bean et al. (1990), Espenshade (1990), White, Bean and

Espenshade (1990) believe that IRCA, in fact, has accomplished its targeted goal of
reducing illegal immigration. However, Donato, Durand, and Massey (1992) find no
evidence that IRCA has significantly deterred illegal immigration from Mexico.
Bustamante (1990) found that there was little change in the daily number of people
crossing the U.S.-Mexico border at two locations as a consequence of IRCA. Acevedo
and Espenshade (1992) point out that the U.S. Immigration Reform and Control Act
(IRCA) passed by the Congress in 1986 tried to control the illegal labor flow solely
through enforcement and had minimal success.

Hill and Pearce (1990) found that

sanctions reduce the supply of illegal labor force by 11% when the border patrol budget is
limited; however, at a substantially high level of budget allocation, the illegal workforce
may be reduced by 50%. Clearly, the border patrol budget has a crucial role to play in
apprehending illegal aliens at the border. The Immigration Act was effective in 1992. It
required caps on legal immigration and also revised the legal admission procedure to
facilitate the entry of family members of U.S. citizens. The estimated total number of
undocumented illegal immigrants residing in the U.S. in 1996 was 5.0 million, varying in
the range between 4.6 to 5.4 million. In 1992 the estimated total was 3.4 million,
implying the growth of illegal aliens at the rate of 275,000 per annum between 1992 and
1996.
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3.3 Mexican Maquiladora System and Its Impact on Illegal Immigration

The Maquiladora System provides a low-cost method of producing goods. Foreign
components and also any machinery required to assemble the components are imported
duty-free into Mexico and then the finished goods are re-exported, generally to the United
States. Duties imposed on the finished goods are significantly low to account for the
value that was added in assembling the product. Automobile and electronics industries
are based on maquiladora employment.

The question is whether the maquiladora system increases the undocumented labor flow
from Mexico to the U.S. Seligson and Williams (1981), Sklair (1989), Brannon and
Lucker(1988) and Dávila and Saenz (1990) find no relationship between maquiladoras
and migration. A survey by Huerta (1990) suggests that 28% of maquiladora workers felt
that their maquiladora training would help them find a job in the U.S. About 16% of the
workers Huerta interviewed, expressed the desire to enter the U.S. illegally.

However,

Huerta concludes that maquiladora draws people to border areas in Mexico, but it does
not necessarily lead to an increase in migration to the U.S. According to Martin (1993), if
the maquiladora industry expands due to foreign direct investment stimulated by NAFTA,
then the expansion is not likely to increase the flow of undocumented labor flow into the
U.S. in the same proportion. However, the relationship between the growth of
maquiladora industry and illegal immigration into the U.S. is slightly positive. Hence, it is
best to encourage the growth of the maquiladora industry somewhere far from the border
in order to reduce illegal labor flow into the United States.
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3.4 Trade Liberalization as Captured in NAFTA

Tariff liberalization did not start in the U.S. and Mexico with the negotiation of NAFTA.
Much before the signing of this agreement the U.S. had been experiencing tariff
liberalization both under the WTO and the GATT. The U.S. and Canada had entered into
a Free Trade Agreement in 1989. This agreement and other preferential trading
arrangements have affected the trade patterns in the U.S. and also influenced illegal
immigration. As pointed out by Anne Krueger (1999) Mexico had already begun to
liberalize trade in the mid 1980s. Mexico had removed all quantitative restrictions on
imports by 1990. The tariff rates were reduced to an average level of 10% against U.S.
imports compared to the U.S. average level of 4% for imports from Mexico. This
emphasizes the fact that NAFTA was only a formal agreement to bring further trade
liberalization that had already started in the 80’s.

NAFTA is an extended version of the Canada-U.S. FTA with the inclusion of Mexico.
The main provision of NAFTA is a phased elimination of tariff and nontariff barriers
among the member countries within 10 years, with the exception of few import-sensitive
products that will be eliminated in 15 years. Also, NAFTA emphasizes investment
opportunities, particularly in key Mexican sectors, such as petrochemicals and financial
services (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993). The objective of NAFTA is to widen the scope of
the market and enlarge the available labor force, thus making North American firms and
workers more competitive in the home and world markets. Whatever be the objectives of
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NAFTA the question remains  what will be its effects? NAFTA is expected to increase
the foreign direct investment in Mexico.

As Hufbauer and Schott (1993) observe even before NAFTA took effect in 1994, it had
generated strong expectations. Capital inflows in Mexico were estimated to be around
$18 billion in 1992, a large portion of which (approximately $5 billion) was foreign direct
investment. The Cuomo Commission on Competitiveness (1992) also emphasized a
similar impact of NAFTA as it expected that NAFTA would shift new plant and
equipment investment from the U.S. to Mexico.

According to Koechlin and Larudee

(1992), the increased investment flows from the United States to Mexico will increase the
capital stock in Mexico from $31 billion to $53 billion between 1992 and 2000, which
will cause the U.S. capital stock to decrease by an equivalent amount. They come to a
very pessimistic conclusion from this assumption, which says that the United States will
lose 290,000 to 490,000 industrial jobs, while Mexico will gain 400,000 to 680,000.
However, this argument has a positive aspect as noted by Sherman Robinson et al.
(1992). They devise a computable general equilibrium model to show that 1% increase in
Mexican capital stock reduces the level of permanent migration from Mexico to the
United States by about 44,000 workers. Hence, an increase of $31 billion to $53 billion
capital stock over approximately $500 billion in 1990 will lead to a reduction of
permanent immigration by at least 260,000. This brings our focus to the migration effects
of NAFTA, particularly trade liberalization, which is discussed in the next section.
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3.5 Trade Liberalization and Illegal Immigration: What are the Linkages

The purpose of NAFTA is to stimulate economic development and job growth in Mexico,
the U.S., and Canada. The effects of NAFTA or trade liberalization may be analyzed in
the context of the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type model. According to this theory,
trade liberalization should raise unskilled labor wages in Mexico since Mexico is
relatively abundant in unskilled labor. Similarly, U.S. unskilled wages should fall leading
to convergence in the wages of the two countries. The wage gap reduction will reduce
the incentive to migrate from Mexico to the U.S. We focus only on unskilled Mexican
workers, since they are the ones who seek to cross the border illegally.

Trade liberalization is expected to close the wage gap between Mexico and the U.S.
(Weintraub, 1984, p.174) and thus reduce the flow of undocumented labor between the
two countries.

However, there are several economists who do not believe in the

Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism as an appropriate description of U.S.-Mexico migration.
Feenstra and Hanson (1995, 1997), Markusen and Venables (1997, 1998), and Markusen
and Zahniser (1997) are of the opinion that the Heckscher-Ohlin mechanism will not
operate in favor of unskilled labor in Mexico and hence will not reduce incentive for
migration.

Martin (1993) argues that in the short to medium run, migration pressure may increase.
He discusses several models and methodologies, all suggesting that NAFTA or trade
liberalization will not eliminate the pressure of illegal immigration in the near future.
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The argument is that a large percentage of the Mexican workforce is engaged in
agriculture and due to the changes in Mexican farm policies and free trade in agricultural
products associated with NAFTA; many of these Mexicans are going to lose their jobs. If
new jobs are not created for these displaced farmers, then they are expected to migrate.
According to Hinojosa and Robinson (1991), there will be 600,000 additional U.S.-bound
immigrants, both legal and illegal, as a result of NAFTA. In Hinojosa and McCleery's
(1992) words: “An FTA by itself is not capable of reducing migration as some have
claimed. Migration, in fact, will increase substantially in the absence of significant
capital inflows to increase employment and wages in Mexico.” A study by the National
Commission for Employment Policy (1992) indicates that between 4 and 5 million
Mexican people are expected to enter the U.S. both legally and illegally without taking
the effects of NAFTA into consideration. According to Martin (1992), most of the
immigrants are expected to return to Mexico. However, a small proportion of them,
perhaps 10% will settle permanently in the U.S. It is possible that in the short run
NAFTA will marginally increase the number of Mexican illegal immigrants. However, it
is expected that in the long run, tariff liberalization will stimulate economic growth,
create new jobs within Mexico, and hence reduce the problem of illegal labor flow.

Some proponents have argued that without NAFTA the number of incoming illegal
immigrants would have been higher. For example it has been speculated that if NAFTA,
had not been approved, there may be 500,000 additional illegal Mexican immigrants
annually (The Wall Street Journal, 28 May, 1993, A7). It is assumed that many potential
migrants are remaining in Mexico in the hope that freer trade will create new jobs for
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them. Nevertheless, NAFTA is expected to boost the Mexican economy. The National
Commission for Employment Policy (1992) predicts that in the first decade of the 21st
century there will be a decrease in the number of Mexican immigrants. According to the
calculations of the consulting firm CIEMEX-WEFA (1992) the gross number of illegal
immigrants would drop by 600,000 as a result of productivity being boosted by NAFTA.

It is unclear at this point how trade liberalization will affect illegal immigration. Based
on the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem, which demonstrates the tendency for factor-price
equalization as a consequence of free trade, the prediction may be due to trade
liberalization the wage gap between the U.S. and Mexico reduces. This in turn, cuts the
volume of illegal labor inflow into the United States. However, there are opposing views
arguing that the undocumented labor flow will increase because Mexican workers
engaged in agriculture will lose their jobs due to policies involved with trade
liberalization and try to seek employment in the U.S. Brown et al. (1992) argue that the
inflow of capital into Mexico would enable the unemployed agricultural workers in
Mexico to find employment opportunities in the growing manufacturing sectors, thereby
reducing illegal immigration. On the other hand, Schiff (1994), Lopez and Schiff (1995)
argue that trade liberalization may increase illegal immigration. Their finding is based on
the fact that migration is costly and once the unskilled workers in Mexico receive higher
wages (due to trade liberalization) it will be easier for them to finance the cost of
migration. The effect of trade liberalization on illegal immigration has been an issue of
policy debate for years and a-priori it is hard to tell what will happen to illegal
immigration and this study attempts to shed light on this issue.
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3.6 The Theoretical Model

The theoretical model presented here is a small-union Meade model (similar to
Bandyopadhyay, 20017) where there are three nations: the U.S., Mexico and the rest of
the world. Mexico and the U.S. are small nations compared to the rest of the world. In
the model, there are two goods 1 and 2, where the U.S. imports good 1, Mexico imports
good 2, and both the goods are imported by the rest of the world. The U.S imposes tariff
rate t1US on good 1 and Mexico imposes tariff rate t2mex on good 2. Prices of the two
goods are exogenously given in the model and are normalized to unity. Wage rate in the
U.S., wUS is greater than wage rate in Mexico, wmex. Due to this difference in the wage
rate, there is an undocumented labor flow from Mexico to the U.S. Although, in reality,
there are unemployment rates in both the economies, for simplicity of the model we
assume full employment. In the empirical analysis unemployment rates will be taken into
consideration. With the level of border enforcement used by the U.S. denoted by e, the
probability of border detection p is then expressed as:
p= p(e) where 1>p'>0 and p''<0

(3.1)

The unskilled workers in Mexico can either remain in Mexico and earn wmex or they can
attempt to cross the border illegally. If they are successful in crossing the border, then
they can earn wUS. 8 However, unsuccessful immigrants have to pay a penalty θ and end
up earning wmex -θ. Assuming Mexican unskilled workers are risk-neutral, a potential

7

Bandyopadhyay's (2001) focus is on second best tariffs and quite different from the issues addressed here.
As Ethier(1986) points out that the firms cannot distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants or the
distinction does not have any implications.
8
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immigrant equates the expected wage from illegal immigration to the certainty wage rate
in Mexico.
(wmex -θ)p+ wUS(1-p) = wmex

(3.2)

⇒ wmex = wUS - θ (p(e)/(1-p(e))

(3.2')

Let p(e)/(1-p(e))=λ(e)
Hence, (3.2') reduces to
wmex = wUS - θ λ (e) where λ'>0

(3.2'')

Let I be the level of illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S., Kex is foreign direct
investment from the U.S. to Mexico and Li and Ki are the labor and capital endowments
of nation i, where i=U.S., Mexico. The rental rates of the two nations are rUS and rmex.
The expenditure-revenue relationship of the U.S. can be written as:
Eus(1+t1US, 1, UUS) = Rus(1+t1US, 1, LUS+I, KUS- Kex) + t1US(E1US- R1US) -e + rmexKex
(3.3)
where rmexKex is the receipt of payment for the investment made.
Similarly, the expenditure-revenue relationship for Mexico can be written as:
Emex(1,1+t2mex,Umex)= Rmex(1,1+t2mex,1,Lmex-I, Kmex+ Kex)+t2mex(E1mex- R1mex)- rmexKex
(3.4)

Consider a situation where foreign direct investment is a policy variable. Note that the
partial of the revenue function with respect to factor endowment yields the factor reward
vector. Hence, using (3.2'') we have:
RLmex(1,1+ t2mex,Lmex -I, Kmex+ Kex)- RLUS(1+ t1US,1,LUS +I, KUS- Kex)+ θλ(e)=0
Equation (3.5) implicitly defines:
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(3.5)

I=I(e, t1US, t2mex, Kex)

(3.6)

Let us assume that revenue function is strictly concave in L for both nations such that
RLLmex<0 and RLLus<0. Let D= RLLmex + RLLus<0. Using (3.5) and (3.6) we have,
I1=∂I/∂e = θ λ'(e)/ D<0

(3.7)

This implies that an increase in border enforcement will lead to a reduction in the level of
illegal immigration.
I2=∂I/∂t1US = - RL1us/ D

(3.8)

I3=∂I/∂t2mex = RL2mex/ D

(3.9)

Equation (3.8) implies that if a tariff decrease in the U.S. on good 1 reduces the wage rate
in the U.S.(i.e. RL1us>0), then it must reduce immigration. Similarly (3.9) implies that if a
reduction in the tariff rate of Mexico on good 2 increases the wage rate of Mexico (i.e.
RL2mex<0), then it must reduce illegal immigration. This is consistent with the findings of
the Heckscher-Ohlin model.
I4=∂I/ ∂Kex = (RLKmex + RLKus)/D= RLKmex /D + RLKus/D

(3.10)

Equation (3.10) implies that if a capital increase in Mexico raises the wage rate (i.e.
RLKmex >0) then it must reduce illegal immigration. Similarly if a decline in capital
endowment in the U.S. (or increase in Kex) reduces the wage rate (i.e. RLKUS >0), then it
must reduce illegal immigration. The argument made above implies that if a foreign
direct investment from the U.S. to Mexico reduces the wage gap between the two
countries, then it should reduce illegal immigration.
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Hence, the effect of border enforcement is negative, but the effect of tariff changes and
foreign direct investment are ambiguous and depend on their effect on wage rates in each
nation.
Totally differentiating (3.6) we get:
dI= (∂I/∂e de +∂I/ ∂KexdKex )+(∂I/∂t1US dt1US+∂I/∂t2mex dt2mex)

(3.11)

Let us assume that good 1 (exported by Mexico) is labor intensive and good 2 (exported
by U.S.) is capital intensive.

From expression (3.8) it is obvious that as the U.S.

liberalizes, wage rate falls9 (i.e RL1us>0), hence ∂I/∂t1US>0.

Converesely, with

liberalization in Mexico the rental rate falls and the wage rises (i.e. RL2mex<0), hence
∂I/∂t2mex>0. Consider the expression in (3.11). The first two terms are negative and the
second two terms are positive. The net effect on illegal immigration depends on the
relative magnitudes of the positive and negative terms.

3.7 The Empirical Model

The empirical specification of the model depends on identification of the factors that
affect illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S. We consider the unemployment rate
explicitly in the empirical model although, for the sake of simplicity, we do not
incorporate it in the theoretical model10. We include the average import tariff rates of
both nations. If we consider the Heckscher-Ohlin model, then due to trade liberalization

9

This is the finding of Stolper Samuleson Theorem.

10

Ethier's (1986) theoretical model on illegal immigration deals with unemployment rate. However, our
context is different. Hence, we follow a different approach.
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the illegal immigration rate should fall as the wage gap between the two countries
narrows. However, other possibilities exist if we abstract from the Heckscher-Ohlin
framework. We use the minimum wage rate of Mexico and the unskilled wage rate of the
U.S. as the wage rates earned by illegal immigrants in the two countries.

In the

theoretical model we consider both tariffs and foreign direct investments. However,
Feenstra and Hanson (1995) note that trade liberalization and foreign investment are
highly complementary and their effects cannot be disentangled. Our data also reveals a
high correlation11 between the tariff rates and foreign direct investment. Hence, we do
not consider foreign direct investment in our empirical analysis. GNP growth in Mexico
is also an important factor. For example, Bratsberg (1995) argues that a 10% increase in
Mexico's GNP might reduce illegal immigration by 10.3%. Other than these factors,
border enforcement plays a vital role in determining the volume of illegal immigration.
The number of illegal aliens entering the U.S. depends on how efficient the border patrol
is in apprehending them at the border. The effects of border patrol can be captured either
by the budget allocated for border patrol or the person-hours spent by the U.S. border
patrol policing the border (border patrol hours). We use both measures of border patrol in
our analysis (separately) to check the robustness of the effect of tariff liberalization. Hill
and Pearce (1990) use the border patrol budget as a measurement of enforcement. On the
other hand, Hanson and Spilimbergo (1999b) and Hanson, Robertson, and Spilimbergo
(1999) use border patrol hours to measure enforcement. According to White et al. (1990)
the efficiency of border enforcement is affected by the budget as well as the number of

11

The correlation coefficient between log of foreign direct investment and log of the ratio between Mexican
and the U.S. tariff rate is 0.8.
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personnel available. Immigration policies like the IRCA (1986) and the Immigration Act
(1990) are also likely to have some impact on the undocumented labor flow from Mexico.
One other important factor is the number of visas issued to Mexican citizens annually.
The impact of the number of visas issued could affect illegal immigration in either
direction. With increasing visa issuance, the incentive for illegal entry may be reduced.
On the other hand, as more people obtain U.S. visas, their relatives might try to cross the
border illegally. As additional regressors we use time trend, the Immigration Act dummy
(whether the fiscal year 1992 or later) and the IRCA dummy (whether the fiscal year 1987
or later). In additional regressions we use dummies to control for alteration in data
collection and reporting procedure by the INS (once in 1977 and then again in 1990).
This will control for the possible effect of definitional change.
The total number of illegal immigrants attempting to cross the border at time t (IMt) is
expressed as:
IMt=IM((Mexican tariff rate)t, (U.S. tariff rate)t, (Mexican unemployment)t/(U.S.
unemployment)t, (Mexican per capita GDP)t, (Mexican minimum wage)t,/(U.S. unskilled
wage)t, (Number of U.S. visas issued to Mexicans)t, Pt)

(3.12)

where Pt is the probability of being apprehended while trying to cross the border illegally.

One disadvantage of the empirical analysis is that we do not observe the number of
individuals that attempt to cross the border illegally.

The number of individuals

apprehended by the U.S. border patrol is used as a proxy for the volume of illegal
immigrants (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999a). Apprehensions at the border (At) are a
function of the people attempting to cross the border illegally and the probability of being
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apprehended. The probability of being apprehended at the border depends on the budget
allocated for the U.S. border patrol (BPbudgett) or border patrol hours (BPhourst).
Assuming all individuals face the same apprehension probability, apprehensions at the
border can be expressed as:
At=P(BPbudgett or BPhourst , IMt)*IM(.)

(3.13)

A reduced form version of the apprehension function is estimated in the analysis.12 Also,
the tariff rates of both countries are the average import tariff rates that apply to the entire
world (which is equivalent to the MFN tariff rates), not necessarily applicable against
each other. Particularly in the case of preferential trading agreement, countries do not
apply the MFN tariff rates against each other. To mitigate this problem, a dummy
variable for NAFTA is used in the analysis.
3.8 Data

The average tariff rates of both countries are calculated by taking the ratio of tariff
revenue collected to the total value of imports. Tariff revenues for both countries are
available from Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, published by the IMF. Report of
the visa office (the U.S. State Department) publishes the number of visas issued to the
Mexicans. Mexican population, GNP and value of import data are obtained from
International Financial Statistics, IMF. U.S. unskilled wage rates are obtained from
unpublished records of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). An annual dataset is
used in the analysis ranging from 1970-1998. Data on apprehensions, border patrol
12

Note IMt and Pt are not observed.
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budget and border patrol hours are obtained from unpublished records of the INS. These
data are for U.S. linewatch activities that occur at the borders. We use these because it is
impossible to find out when people apprehended in the U.S. interior have entered the
country.

3.9 Estimation Results

While estimating equation (3.13) a log apprehension function is estimated13. Factors
affecting apprehensions are also expressed in log form14. Prior to estimation, there are
some issues that need to be discussed. First, we note that shocks to apprehensions may be
serially correlated. The shock might be an unknown factor that increases the
undocumented labor flow into the U.S. To control for serial correlation in shocks, we
estimate two specifications of the apprehension function. In the first specification, the
disturbance term follows a first order autoregressive {AR(1)} process. In the second
specification, we impose the assumption of a unit root in the disturbance term and
estimate the apprehension function in first differences15. The second issue is related to
border enforcement. There is an issue of endogeneity of border patrol budget or border
patrol hours where the budget or hours simultaneously get determined with
apprehensions. In the U.S., the INS is responsible for protecting the U.S. border and it is
constrained by the budget allocation for enforcement. However, the INS has the authority
13

See figure 3.1 for change in log apprehensions.
Figure 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 show the change in log border patrol budget, change in log border patrol hours
and log U.S tariff and Mexican tariff rates respectively.
14

15

The apprehension function does not exhibit nonstationarity..The augmented Dickey-Fuller test rejects the
null hypothesis of a unit root.
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to allocate resources appropriately. Therefore, it might increase the resources for the
border patrol or increase the number of hours spent in policing the border in response to
an increase in the number of people attempting to cross the border illegally. To control
for endogeneity of border patrol measures, we use instrumental variable technique. The
instruments used are real U.S. government expenditures on national defense and a series
of dummies for the occurrence of presidential or congressional election in the current
fiscal year (Hanson and Spilimbergo, 1999a).

Estimation results are shown in Table 3.1 through Table 3.7. The first six tables depict
ordinary least square (OLS) results in the first column and instrumental variable (IV)
results in the second column. Table 3.7 presents the first difference results, where border
patrol hours and border patrol budget are used as enforcement measures, in the first and
second columns, respectively. It is an annual dataset with the time period for the
estimation being 1970 through 1998.

Table 3.1 through Table 3.3 show AR(1) estimation results with border patrol budget
used as enforcement measure. The same estimation results with border patrol hours are
listed in Table 3.4 to Table 3.6. The estimated coefficient of a regressor can be interpreted
as the long run elasticity of border apprehensions with respect to that regressor. The
tables show that the elasticity of apprehensions with respect to border patrol budget or
border patrol hours is positive. However, border patrol budget and border patrol hours
turn out to be insignificant in all regressions. This is not surprising, since often in reality
illegal workers are welcome in the U.S. because they provide cheap labor. Hanson and
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Spilimbergo (1999b) note that growers in California and Texas often declare that without
low-wage foreign labor they would be forced to cut back production or completely shut
down their operations. In favor of hiring illegal immigrants a California grower said.
“The reality is that if the government was able to stop everybody at the border, there
would be no agriculture. You wouldn't be eating asparagus” (Walsh, 1999). Calavita
(1992, p. 35) documents a Texas grower remarking, “For a number of years citizens of
Mexico entered the United States both legally and illegally, engaging in agricultural
work. While from time to time they have been picked up by the Border Patrol, there has
been a tendency on part of the Border Patrol to concentrate their efforts on deporting only
those who are bad citizens. This arrangement, although it did not have the stamp of
legislative approval, has worked out very nicely for our farmers down here.”

Results reveal that current and lagged Mexican tariff rates have positive and statistically
significant correlation with apprehension. This implies that as Mexico liberalizes, the
flow of undocumented labor decreases.

This is consistent with the finding of the

Heckscher-Ohlin model. The current U.S. tariff rate appears to be insignificant in all
regressions.

However, the lagged U.S. tariff rate is significantly negative in some

regressions. This implies that past U.S liberalization will provide a positive drive to
illegal labor flow.

However the ratio between Mexican and the U.S. wage rate is

insignificant. This can be explained by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem. According to this
theory as a consequence of trade liberalization the wage difference between Mexico and
the U.S. will reduce. Based on this we can argue that since the tariff rate influences wage
rate, the impact of the wages become insignificant in the regression while tariff rates
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capture the entire impact. The ratio between the unemployment rates of Mexico and the
U.S. is also significant and positive. Obviously, higher unemployment in Mexico will
exert an upward pressure on the unskilled labor force to emigrate illegally. NAFTA and
IRCA dummies turn out to be significantly negative. The introduction of NAFTA and
IRCA seems to reduce the flow of illegal immigrants. Even though many economists are
not too optimistic about the effects of NAFTA in the short run, we find that even in the
short run its introduction reduces illegal immigration. The IRCA finding is consistent
with Bean et al (1990) for their analysis between 1977 and 1989. The dummy variable
for the passage of the Immigration Act does not have any significant effect on illegal
immigration except for Table 3.6, where enforcement is measured by border patrol hours.
Immigration Act has a significantly negative effect on illegal immigration for this
particular specification. In Table 3.5 and Table 3.6, visas issued to Mexicans exhibit
significantly negative impact on illegal immigration. This implies a lower incentive for
immigrants to cross the border illegally with the issuance of larger number of visas. The
results for the first difference model in Table 3.7 emphasize the role of Mexican per
capita GDP. We find that it affects illegal immigrants negatively. As expected the flow of
illegal immigrants from Mexico should reduce with the increase in Mexican per capita
GDP.

3.10 Conclusion

This essay examines the determinants of illegal immigration between the U.S. and
Mexico. We first provide a theoretical model and then an empirical analysis. The novelty
of the analysis is to incorporate tariff rates as a determinant of illegal immigration. The
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Mexican tariff rates appear to have a significant effect on illegal immigration. We find
that as Mexico pursues trade liberalization policies, the flow of illegal immigration from
Mexico to the U.S. falls. This result is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model. It is
robust to the choice of border patrol measure and the specification of the model.
However, border patrol measures do not appear to have significant effects on
apprehension. The finding is very interesting, because it suggests that trade policy may be
a more effective tool in controlling illegal immigration compared to immigration policy.
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Table 3.1: First AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with
Border Patrol Budget as Enforcement Measure
Constant
Log Border Patrol Budget
Log Mexican Tariff Rate
Log U.S. Tariff Rate
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
NAFTA
Immigration Act
IRCA
AR(1)
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson statistic

OLS1
9.88
(6.17)
0.28
(0.33)
0.30**
(0.10)
-0.25
(0.19)
0.26
(0.30)
0.45***
(0.11)
-0.49
(0.33)
-0.10
(0.13)
-0.33***
(0.11)
0.01
(0.10)
-0.45***
(0.11)
0.78***
(0.08)
0.09
(0.05)
28
0.98
2.09

IV1
12.01
(8.67)
0.17
(0.45)
0.29**
(0.11)
-0.27
(0.19)
0.27
(0.31)
0.43***
(0.12)
-0.50
(0.34)
-0.11
(0.15)
-0.33**
(0.11)
0.01
(0.11)
-0.44***
(0.12)
0.77***
(0.08)
0.10*
(0.05)
28
0.98
2.02

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
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Table 3.2: Second AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with
Border Patrol Budget as Enforcement Measure
OLS2
Constant
Log of Border Patrol Budget
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate (-1)
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate (-1)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
NAFTA
Immigration Act
IRCA
Time
AR(1)
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson statistic

4.03
(6.00)
0.62
(0.32)
0.40***
(0.09)
0.23**
(0.08)
-0.14
(0.17)
-0.39**
(0.17)
0.05
(0.28)
0.66***
(0.11)
-0.24
(0.30)
-0.17
(0.10)
-0.31***
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.09)
-0.53***
(0.10)
0.06
(0.06)
0.82***
(0.09)
27
0.98
2.48

IV2
9.10
(8.51)
0.34
(0.44)
0.40***
(0.10)
0.21*
(0.10)
-0.19
(0.19)
-0.39**
(0.18)
0.13
(0.29)
0.61***
(0.15)
-0.34
(0.31)
-0.18
(0.11)
-0.33***
(0.09)
-0.09
(0.10)
-0.49***
(0.12)
0.10*
(0.06)
0.78***
(0.09)
27
0.98
2.35

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
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Table 3.3: Third AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with Border
Patrol Budget as Enforcement Measure
OLS3
IV3
Constant
4.02
7.76
(6.52)
(9.44)
Log of Border Patrol Budget
0.66
0.44
(0.39)
(0.54)
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate
0.38***
0.38***
(0.10)
(0.11)
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate (-1)
0.22**
0.20**
(0.10)
(0.10)
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate
-0.20
-0.21
(0.22)
(0.24)
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate (-1)
-0.37*
-0.38*
(0.19)
(0.20)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
0.13
0.15
(0.33)
(0.35)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment
0.65***
0.62***
(0.13)
(0.16)
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
-0.33
-0.36
(0.37)
(0.38)
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
-0.16
-0.18
(0.12)
(0.13)
NAFTA
-0.30**
-0.32***
(0.10)
(0.10)
Immigration Act
-0.07
-0.07
(0.10)
(0.11)
IRCA
-0.53***
-0.49***
(0.11)
(0.12)
D1
-0.07
-0.05
(0.14)
(0.15)
D2
0.03
0.03
(0.12)
(0.14)
Time
0.04
0.08
(0.09)
(0.09)
AR(1)
0.86***
0.82***
(0.11)
(0.13)
Number of observations
27
27
Adjusted R-squared
0.98
0.98
Durbin-Watson statistic
2.39
2.31
Note: 1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a twotailed test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
3. D1 is the dummy to control for any definitional change that may have occurred in 1977.
4. D2 is the dummy to control for any definitional change that may have occurred in 1990.
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Table 3.4: Fourth AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with
Border Patrol Hours as Enforcement Measure

Constant
Log of Border Patrol Hours
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment rate
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
NAFTA
Immigration Act
IRCA
AR(1)
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson statistic

OLS4
12.92 ***
(3.00)
0.15
(0.18)
0.26**
(0.11)
-0.25
(0.19)
0.21
(0.32)
0.40***
(0.10)
-0.42
(0.35)
-0.13
(0.12)
-0.33 ***
(0.11)
0.02
(0.11)
-0.40***
(0.11)
0.77***
(0.08)
0.11**
(0.04)
28
0.98
2.14

IV4
10.96**
(3.85)
0.29
(0.25)
0.22*
(0.11)
-0.21
(0.20)
0.15
(0.32)
0.38**
(0.10)
-0.34
(0.34)
-0.13
(0.12)
-0.33**
(0.11)
0.03
(0.11)
-0.38***
(0.12)
0.79***
(0.08)
0.09**
(0.04)
28
0.98
2.29

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
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Table 3.5: Fifth AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with
Border Patrol Hours as Enforcement Measure
Constant
Log of Border Patrol Hours
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate (-1)
Log of US Tariff Rate
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate (-1)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment rate
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
NAFTA
Immigration Act
IRCA
Time
AR(1)
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson stat

OLS5
13.02***
(3.54)
0.16
(0.19)
0.33**
(0.12)
0.18*
(0.08)
-0.19
(0.21)
-0.33
(0.20)
0.07
(0.34)
0.52***
(0.11)
-0.26
(0.38)
-0.21*
(0.12)
-0.33***
(0.10)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
0.12***
(0.04)
0.76***
(0.10)
27
0.98
2.35

IV5
12.48**
(4.16)
0.19
(0.23)
0.33**
(0.12)
0.18*
(0.09)
-0.18
(0.21)
-0.32
(0.20)
0.06
(0.35)
0.52***
(0.11)
-0.24
(0.39)
-0.21*
(0.12)
-0.33***
(0.10)
-0.07
(0.10)
-0.42***
(0.10)
0.12***
(0.04)
0.76***
(0.10)
27
0.98
2.41

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
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Table 3.6: Sixth AR(1) Specification of Border Apprehension with
Border Patrol Hours as Enforcement Measure
OLS6
IV6
Constant
18.05***
18.21***
(4.70)
(5.72)
Log of Border Patrol Hours
0.07
0.07
(0.21)
(0.26)
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate
0.34*
0.34*
(0.16)
(0.16)
Log of Mexican Tariff Rate (-1)
0.34
0.34*
(0.19)
(0.18)
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate
-0.32
-0.32
(0.23)
(0.24)
Log of U.S. Tariff Rate (-1)
-1.04***
-1.04***
(0.26)
(0.27)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
0.81
0.82
(0.38)
(0.39)
Log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unemployment rate
0.67**
0.67**
(0.25)
(0.23)
Log of Mexican per capita GDP
-0.75
-0.76
(0.48)
(0.48)
Log of visas issued to Mexicans
-0.44*
-0.44*
(0.20)
(0.21)
NAFTA
-0.59**
-0.59**
(0.25)
(0.22)
Time
0.21***
0.21***
(0.04)
(0.04)
Immigration Act
-0.41*
-0.41*
(0.20)
(0.20)
IRCA
-0.50***
-0.50***
(0.11)
(0.11)
D1
0.16
0.16
(0.11)
(0.10)
D2
0.06
0.06
(0.21)
(0.21)
AR(1)
0.58
0.57
(0.39)
(0.34)
Number of observations
27
27
Adjusted R-squared
0.97
0.97
Durbin-Watson statistic
2.62
2.62
Note: 1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two tailed test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
3. D1 is the dummy to control for any definitional change that may have occurred in 1977.
4. D2 is the dummy to control for any definitional change that may have occurred in 1990.
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Table 3.7: First Difference Specification of Border Apprehension
OLS7
0.18
(0.05)

Constant
Difference in log of Border Patrol Budget
Difference in log of Border Patrol Hours
Difference in log of Mexican Tariff Rate
Difference in log of U.S. Tariff Rate
Difference in log of ratio between Mexican and U.S. unskilled wage
Difference in log of ration between Mexican and U.S. unemployment
Difference in log of Mexican per capita GDP
Difference in the number of visas issued to Mexicans
Difference in NAFTA
Difference in Immigration Act
Difference in IRCA
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared
Durbin-Watson statistic

0.04
(0.25)
0.26*
(0.15)
-0.36
(0.22)
0.61
(0.37)
0.35**
(0.13)
-0.72*
(0.38)
-0.20
(0.15)
-0.38**
(0.13)
-0.06
(0.14)
-0.44***
(0.13)
28
0.55
1.62

OLS8
0.16**
(0.06)
0.19
(0.42)

0.26*
(0.13)
-0.41*
(0.24)
0.58
(0.37)
0.40***
(0.14)
-0.77*
(0.41)
-0.11
(0.16)
-0.39**
(0.14)
-0.03
(0.13)
-0.45***
(0.15)
28
0.53
1.45

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.

62

Table 3.8: Descriptive statistics of the variables

Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Number of
Apprehensions
Number of Border patrol
hours
Border patrol budget
(in U.S. $)
Mexican tariff rate
(in percentage)
U.S. tariff rate
(in percentage)

591214

592432

304013

79702

1224740

2564161

2148202

1371672

1044147

7604083

2.12e+08

1.14e+08

2.14e+08

2.84e+07

8.75e+08

9.62

7.14

6.98

1.87

28.14

3.74

3.48

1.20

2.02

7.02

63

Figure 3.1: Change in log apprehensions over time
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Figure 3.2: Change in log border patrol budget over time
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Figure 3.3: Change in log border patrol hours over time
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Figure 3.4: Change in Log Mexican and Log U.S. tariff rates over time
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Chapter 4
Trade Liberalization and Legal Immigration

4.1 Introduction

Recent immigration literature and immigration policy discussions have mostly focused on
the increasing number of illegal immigrants to the U.S. However, legal immigration to
the United States has surged over the past few decades. Between 1971 and 1998 the
number of legal immigrants soared from 370,478 to 643,025 (INS statistical yearbook).
There is increasing concern that domestic workers may face reduced employment
opportunities and wages due to soaring immigration. On the other hand, others have
suggested that legal immigrants may be used to meet labor shortages in the U.S. In 1988
the Secretary of Labor argued, “the U.S. economy cannot endure long term, large scale
disruptions caused by lack of a competent work-force, domestic or foreign” (U.S.
Government Printing Office [GPO] 1988). Admitting more legal immigrants, a large
portion of which are skilled, can be viewed as a way to achieve competitiveness.

This study attempts to link legal migration to the U.S. to trade liberalization. In the
migration literature, several studies have demonstrated linkage between trade
liberalization and immigration. A CEPR study (1992) finds that a movement towards a
relatively liberal trade regime between the EU and the Central and Eastern European
countries (CEEC) reduces immigration from the CEEC to the EU.

Similarly,

Zimmermann (1993) argues that migration pressure from the East and South can be
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reduced by exporting capital and liberalizing trade. However, Lopez and Schiff (1995)
conclude that migration of skilled workers is unaffected by trade liberalization in a
developing country with a stable population.

Migration theory was first built upon the push-pull formulation of Ravenstein (1889).
Migration occurs from areas of low opportunity to areas of high opportunity. In the past
few decades not only has the volume of immigration increased, the demographic
composition of immigration has also changed. This provides the basis for studying the
flow of legal immigration from various countries that have contributed significantly to the
high volume of legal immigration to the U.S. in the past. The source countries (where the
legal immigration originates) in our sample are: India, El Salvador, Korea, Mexico, the
Philippines, the United Kingdom, and Canada; and the host country (i.e. the destination
of the immigrants) is the United States. The objective is to study the impact of trade
liberalization in the origin countries on legal immigration to the United States. The
sample period ranges from 1980 to 1998.

The paper is organized in the following sections. Section 4.2 discusses the definition of
legal immigration and related concepts, and also the changes in immigration laws.
Section 4.3. is about trade liberalization as experienced by the countries in our sample.
Section 4.4 discusses the push-pull theory of immigration that relates to this study.
Section 4.5 describes the empirical model, Section 4.6 discusses the data, Section 4.7
presents the estimation results, and Section 4.8 concludes the paper.
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4.2 Legal Immigration, Immigration Laws and Related Basic Concepts

Prior to examining the impact of trade liberalization on legal immigration, it is important
to understand what exactly “legal immigration” means. Legal immigration consists of
immigrants and nonimmigrants. Immigrants are citizens of other countries, who have
been granted visas allowing them to live and work permanently in the United States.
Nonimmigrants are granted temporary entry into the U.S. for a specific purpose, such as
to visit, work, or study. We are interested in the impact of liberalization only on the
immigrants.

Immigrants are the people who decide to migrate depending on the

availability and relative attractiveness of job opportunities in their home and foreign
countries. Clearly, these incentives are affected by trade liberalization. Immigrants not
only include people immigrating permanently from their home countries but also those
nonimmigrants in the U.S. who have been granted immigrant status.

The most important concept in the immigration literature that is relevant for our study is
how we measure legal immigration. The objective is to filter the skilled legal immigrants
from the total volume of legal immigrants. This leads us to focus on the immigrants
admitted under employment-based preference and family-based preference.16 These two
categories admit the maximum number of skilled legal immigrants. However, the entire
population of family-sponsored immigrants may not be skilled immigrants. To determine
the exact number of skilled immigrants in the entire population of family sponsored
immigrants is beyond our scope.

Hence, we measure the number of skilled legal

16

The preference system decides the priority of the immigrants and permits entry based on their priority. It
allots certain number of immigrant visas for each preference category.
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immigrants by the total annual volume of employment-based and family-based
immigrants.

In this context, it is useful to discuss the U.S. Immigration Act, which has made it
possible for immigrants to gain entrance into the U.S. An understanding of the various
paths of admission and how these have changed over time provides an important
framework for examining the impact on immigrants. While immigration laws have
evolved over several centuries, we will focus on the changes that have occurred recently.
The changes in immigration laws that occurred between 1980 and 1998 are the Refugee
Act of 1980, the Immigration and Reform Control Act of 1986, and the Immigration Act
of 1990 (Sorensen et al., 1992).

In the 1980s Congress passed two important laws relating to immigrants and refugees.
The Refugee Act of 1980 changed the preference system of the immigrants and
established a separate admission process for them. The Immigration and Reform Control
Act of 1986 was targeted to control illegal immigration. The objective of this program
was to

(1) impose sanctions on employers hiring illegal immigrants and (2) offer

opportunity to illegal immigrants who had stayed in the U.S. for at least five years or who
had worked in agriculture for a specified period of time to adjust to legal resident status.
Obviously, this had implications for the number of legal immigrants.

The Immigration Act of 1990, which was implemented in FY 1992, had a far-reaching
effect on legal immigrants. The Immigration Act of 1990 modified the immigrant
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categories of admission. It divided the preference class into two broad categories: familysponsored and independent immigration. The act specified that the family-sponsored limit
might not go below a minimum of 226,000. The independent immigration category
includes employment-based immigration and diversity immigration.

The 1990

Immigration Act set the worldwide limit on employment-based preference immigration at
140,000 plus unused family-preference visas in the previous year.

The diversity

immigration includes people that replaced the earlier categories for nationals of
underrepresented countries and countries adversely affected by the Immigration and
Nationality Act Amendments of 1965. The annual limit on diversity immigration was set
at 40,000 for FY 1992-1994 under a transitional diversity program, and, beginning in FY
1995, the limit has been 55,000 under a permanent diversity program (Statistical
Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service). Table 4.1 depicts the different
categories of immigrants under the Immigration Act of 1990.
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Table 4.1: The Immigration Act of 1990

Family-sponsored Immigration Total = 226,00017
First Preference - 10% to unmarried adult children of U.S. citizens
Second Preference - 50% to spouses and unmarried children of permanent
resident aliens
Third Preference - 10% to married children of U.S. citizens
Fourth - 30% to brothers and sisters of adult U.S. citizens
Independent Immigration
Total = 180,000 (FY1992-1994)
= 195,000 (FY 1995 onward)
Employment-based immigration - 140,000
Priority workers - 40,000
Professional with advanced degrees - 40,000
Professionals; skilled and unskilled workers (10,000 limit) - 40,000
Special Immigrants - 10,000
Investors of $1 million - 10,000
Diversity Immigrants - 40,000 (FY 1992-1994)
- 55,000 (FY 1995 onward)

Family-sponsored immigrants and independent immigrants comprising employmentbased immigrants and diversity immigrants are subject to a worldwide numerical
limitation.18 Apart from these immigrants, there are legalization dependents that are also
subject to the worldwide numerical cap.

Legalization dependents are spouses and

children of illegal aliens legalized under the provisions of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986. A maximum of 55,000 visas were allotted for this immigrant
category.

Immediate relatives of U.S. citizens and illegal aliens legalized under the

provision of IRCA (1986) are not subject to a numerical cap.

17

This total does not include the immediate relatives of U.S. citizens. The immediate relatives are excluded
from the worldwide numerical cap on immigrants.
18
Immigration law decides how many immigrants worldwide will be granted visas.
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4.3 Trade Liberalization as Experienced by Countries in Our Sample

Trade liberalization is a central topic of policy discussion and debate. It has been an
integral part of trade policy in a large number of countries. This has created pressure for
countries that have chosen to be closed economies to reconsider their policy. On the other
hand, some countries on the path of liberalization are also evaluating their priorities and
considering whether to continue with liberalization. The following discussion provides
an overview of the process of liberalization as experienced by the countries in our sample.

We start the discussion with the North American countries (the U.S., Canada and
Mexico) that have experienced more or less similar liberalization process due to the
preferential trading arrangement among them. The U.S. has been pursuing a policy of
trade liberalization, seeking open markets and expanded international trade, for more than
half a century. A milestone in the process of trade liberalization was marked by NAFTA
(North American Free Trade Agreement in 1994) that extended the bilateral free trade
agreement between the U.S. and Canada to a trilateral agreement that included Mexico.
The real GDP growth in the U.S. averaged over 2.8% during the years 1992-1996 and
reached a level of 3.9% in 1997 and 1998. According to a WTO Secretariat report, trade
and investment liberalization that resulted due to the Uruguay round agreements and
NAFTA, acted as a driving force behind this. A study by the GATT estimated that, by
FY 2005, there will be an increase in global production of $510 billion (constant 1990
dollars) with the U.S. contributing $122 billion. This shows the immense impact of trade
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liberalization on the U.S. economy (World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews,
United States, July 1999).

Canada is another country that has been on the path of trade liberalization for several
decades. By the end of the 1980s, Canadian tariff rates against U.S. goods averaged
around 8% and was 15% against all other countries. Due to the staged liberalization
scheduled under NAFTA, tariffs were eliminated on vast majority of U.S. and Mexican
products (Schwanen, 2001). Antidumping measures that had been a significant barrier to
trade in Canada for years have also started declining. Foreign investment in Canada
reached a level of U.S. $143 billion in 1998 from U.S.$110 billion in 1990 and U.S.$54
billion in 1980.

Mexico had a strong protectionist policy until the early 1980's, when it decided to
liberalize, culminating with the signing of NAFTA in 1993. Even though trade
liberalization in Mexico entered into a new era in 1993, Mexico actually had almost
completely eliminated its trade barriers in the manufacturing sector by then (Roberts,
2001).

Liberalization actually started in Mexico in 1983. In the first phase of

liberalization that took place between 1983 and 1985, import licenses were reduced from
100% to 83 %. By 1988 these were reduced to 22%, with the average tariff rate as low
as 11%. Between 1988 and 1992, the focus was on fine-tuning trade and service sector
liberalization simultaneously. The NAFTA agreement between the three North American
countries marked a new milestone in the history of liberalization. It brought remarkably
significant liberalization in the agricultural sector. Tariffs were being eliminated from
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60% of dutiable goods. By 1998 an additional 9% could be imported duty-free (Roberts,
2001).

The effect of liberalization in Mexico has been remarkable.

Reducing

dependency on oil exports, Mexico has diversified its exports, and in 1998 Mexican
export was  U.S.$117 billion compared to U.S.$18 billion in 1980. Foreign direct
investment in Mexico has increased, creating more job opportunities and increasing the
Mexican wage rate. One would expect that these changes would impact legal (and illegal)
immigration.

The next set of countries in our discussion are the three Asian countries that had relatively
high tariff rates to begin with in the early 1980s but pursued a rigorous liberalization
program to be at par with the rest of the world. For example, Korea revised its trade
policy in the latter part of the 1980s as it started assuming new responsibilities
commensurate with its enhanced global role. Major objectives of Korea’s trade policy
include sustaining the momentum of Korea’s import liberalization program and removing
some institutional barriers blocking increased access to the Korean market. Continued
liberalization has increased Korea’s import liberalization ratio (number of import free
items as a percentage of total import items). By the end of 1999, Korea’s import
liberalization ratio reached 99.9% (Association of Foreign Trading Agents of Korea,
AFTAK). Throughout the 1990s, Korea continued to remove barriers to encourage
foreign direct investment into Korea as well as to enhance outgoing foreign investment.
Following the 1997 economic crisis, Korea removed almost all barriers to incoming
foreign direct investment. As a result, foreign direct investment in Korea increased from
U.S.$788.5 million in 1990 to U.S.$5415.6 million in 1998. Foreign investment overseas
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increased from U.S.$1051.6 million in 1990 to U.S.$4799.4 million in 1998. By late
1998, the Korean economy started showing positive signs of recovery, and by 1999 all
indicators had returned to their pre-crisis levels.

In India, a slow process of liberalization had started in the mid 1980s that was carried
forward with the launching of a major program of economic liberalization (stabilization
and structural adjustment) in July 1991 (Hussain, 1997). Since then, a tariff reduction
program has continued. Tariffs have been reduced from an average of 71% in 1993 to an
average of 35% in 1998.

The number of goods subject to import licensing has been

gradually reduced. Between 1993 and 1996, merchandise exports grew at an annual rate
of 20% in current U.S. dollar terms. Larger flows of foreign direct investment and
increased international trade facilitated India’s annual growth rate increase in that period
(World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews, India, April 1998). Then, a slowdown
in 1997 called for even more accelerated reform and faster trade liberalization.
Simplifying the foreign investment regime by opening up a number of sectors to foreign
direct investment and integration with the world economy can be important for changes in
Indian immigration patterns.

Another Asian country in our sample that has liberalized since the early 1980's is the
Philippines. Between 1981 and 1985 quantitative restrictions were removed from 900
items and the nominal average tariff protection was brought down from 43% in 1981 to
28% in 1985. However, exports fell and imports taking advantage of the liberalized
home industries severely destroyed domestic industries. The Philippines experienced no
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growth between 1983 and 1993. In 1992 there was accelerated privatization, deregulation
and liberalization of trade, investment and finance (Bello, 1999). With this economic
reform and trade liberalization, the Philippines reduced the average MFN tariff from 26%
in 1992 to 10% in 1999. Exports rose and the Philippines facilitated the flow of foreign
investment and goods that are required to increase the competitiveness.

The other two countries in the study are El Salvador and the United Kingdom. El
Salvador adopted a serious stabilization and structural adjustment program in 1989 that
resulted in increased economic growth and a fall in inflation. The average real growth in
El Salvador between 1992 and 1995 was 6.7%, and it was between 3.5% and 4% in 1996.
El Salvador significantly reduced the tariff rates over the period and all rates had been
bound19 (World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Reviews, El Salvador, November
1996).

The United Kingdom, as a part of the European Union, has been reducing tariff rates for
manufacture goods under the Uruguay round commitments (World Trade Organization,
Trade Policy Reviews, European Union, July 1995). Under the EU umbrella of tariff cut,
the United Kingdom reduced average most favored nation (MFN) tariffs on industrial
products to 4.9% in 1997. The much higher tariff rates in agriculture were brought down
to 20.8% in 1997.

19

The bound rate for El Salvador implies that tariff rates cannot be increased above these rates.
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4.4 Push-Pull Theory of Migration

The Harris-Todaro two sector model of migration dominated the migration literature in
the developing countries through most of the 1970s. According to Harris-Todaro (1970,
AER) migration is affected by wage differentials between regions (within a country or
between countries). People move from low-wage areas to high-wage areas. However,
Fields (1982) and House and Rempel (1980) showed that changes in conditions at
migration origins do not always lead to outcomes predicted by the Harris-Todaro model.
In particular, they found that higher incomes in the migration origin do not necessarily
deter the flow of out-migration.

In the 1980s the economists turned their attention to push-pull factors of migration. Any
migration is a result of push forces at the origin and pull forces at the destination. Push
factors are generally poor economic conditions, lagging employment opportunities in the
origin country.

Pull factors are prosperous economic conditions and attractive

employment opportunities in the destination country. Pull factors cannot be properly
evaluated in this study, since we abstract from the choice of destination that the
immigrants might consider. Instead, we have only one destination (i.e., the U.S.) and our
analysis is focused on the immigrants coming into the U.S.

Zimmermann (1996) explains the push-pull theory of immigration with demand and
supply curves as demand-pull and supply-push migration. Figure 4.1 depicts the demand
and supply curves. If aggregate demand increases due to a demand shock, then output and
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prices rise. As a consequence, wage increases attracting more immigrants. This leads to a
downward shift in the supply curve and AB in the diagram represents pull immigration.
On the other hand, an influx of migrants without a change in the demand curve shifts the
supply curve downward, leading to an increase in the output level and fall in prices. In the
diagram AC represents supply-push migration. To summarize, supply-push migration
affects only the supply curve, whereas demand-pull migration affects the demand curve,
which in turn shifts the supply curve. All factors associated with the destination economy
that cause migration to happen are considered as the pull factors. Push factors are
characteristics of the origin country contributing to migration, i.e., considered as push
migration.
Figure 4.1: Push-Pull Migration

Price
Demand
Supply

A

B
C

Output

AB: Pull migration

AC: Push migration
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4.5 Empirical Model

The empirical model can be specified with the identification of the factors affecting legal
immigration to the United States. As mentioned earlier, legal immigrants are measured by
the number of skilled immigrants originating from seven different countries.

The

measure of skilled immigrants is the total number of employment-based and familysponsored immigrants20. Countries are selected based on their level of employment and
family- sponsored immigrants to the United States. El Salvador, India, the Philippines,
Korea, Mexico, Canada and the United Kingdom all have high level of immigrants
admitted into the U.S. under the specified categories.

The factors affecting skilled legal immigrants are specific to destination as well as origin
countries.

The push-pull theory of migration allows us to measure the pull factors

coming from the destination and the push factors forcing people to immigrate. We limit
our destination to the U.S. alone. This does not allow us to evaluate the cross-country
comparison of pull factors.

The various pull and push factors incorporated in our model are the population, gross
domestic product (GDP), unemployment rates and tariff rates, of both destination and
origin. Population measures the size of the economy and with an increase in population
of the origin nation, legal immigration is expected to rise. GDP is a measure of wealth
and the wealthier the origin country is, the less will be incentive there for people to
20

Employment-based and family-sponsored immigrants are subject to per country limit. Please see the
appendix for details.
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migrate.

With higher unemployment rate in the origin one should expect legal

immigration to rise. Tariff rates are the primary variables in our model measuring
protectionism. Low tariff rates indicate that a nation is on the path of liberalization.

Additional regressors are the Immigration Act dummy (whether the fiscal year 1992 or
later), the NAFTA dummy (whether the fiscal year 1994 or later), time trend, and two
interaction terms. The first interaction term is the product between the tariff rate and the
NAFTA dummy and the second interaction term is the tariff rate multiplied by the
Immigration Act dummy. Obviously the NAFTA dummy captures the liberalization
effect only among the U.S., Canada and Mexico. The remaining variables incorporated in
the model are: education levels of the origin countries, the wage difference between
skilled and unskilled labor in the U.S., and antidumping actions taken by the U.S.
between 1980 and 1998. "Dumping" in international trade refers to a situation where
exports are priced below the level that prevails in the exporting nation. Under the General
Agreement of Tariff and Trade (GATT), member countries are allowed to take actions to
counteract the effects of dumping if injury made is established. Therefore, antidumping
actions can act as non-tariff barriers and retard the process of liberalization. However, we
do not have information about antidumping actions taken by the U.S. against the
countries in our sample. Data covers total antidumping actions by the U.S. against all
countries for each fiscal year from 1980 to 1998 (Zang, 2001).
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The total number of skilled legal immigrants21 entering the U.S. at any time t (LMt) can
be expressed as:
lnLMt = b0 + b1lnTARORGt + b2lnTARDESTt + b3 lnPOPORGt + b4 lnPOPDESTt +
b5lnGDPORGt + b6lnGDPDESTt + b7lnEDUORGt + b8lnWGPREMDESTt + b9 DIMMACT
+ b10DNAFTA + b10TIME + et
where the b's are coefficients and e is the error term that is normally distributed with
mean zero. The model is estimated for the time period between 1980 and 1998. The
double log specification allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities. Following is
the list of the variables included in the model: TARORG is tariff of the origin country22,
TARDEST is tariff of the destination, POPORG is population of the origin, POPDEST is
population of the destination, GDPORG is GDP of the origin, GDPDEST is GDP of the
destination, EDUORG is the level of education in the origin, WGPREMDEST is the
difference in the skilled and unskilled wage in the destination, DIMMACT is the
Immigration Act dummy, DNAFTA is the NAFTA dummy and TIME is the time trend.

4.6 Data

Data on skilled legal immigration measured by the total number of employment-based
and family-based immigrants is obtained from the Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service for each fiscal year from 1980 to 1998. The
average tariff rates of both countries are calculated by taking the ratio of tariff revenues

21

Figure 4.2 shows the number of skilled legal immigrants from the origin nation between 1980 and 1998.

22

Figure 4.3 and 4.4 depict the movement of the tariff rates for the origin countries between 1980 and 1998.
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collected to the total value of imports. This measure of the average tariff rate is the same
as the trade-weighted average tariff that weighs each tariff by the share of total imports in
that import category. Tariff revenues for both countries are available from Government
Finance Statistics Yearbook published by the IMF. GDP, population, and unemployment
rates of the origins and the destination are obtained from the World Development
Indicators of the World Bank for the period of 1980-1998. The education variable of the
origin countries is the secondary school enrollment rate. It follows the definition of the
International Standard Classification of Education on net secondary school enrollment
ratio. It is the ratio (in percentage) of the number of children of official school age (as
defined by the national education system) who are enrolled in school, to the population of
the corresponding official school age.

This data is also available in the World

Development Indicators of the World Bank. The Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes the
skilled destination (i.e. the U.S.) wage rate and the unskilled wage rate is obtained from
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). The Congressional budget office is the
source for antidumping action data.

4.7 Estimation Results

As mentioned earlier, skilled legal immigration is estimated in log form as a function of
log dependent variables. An ordinary least squared method, a fixed effect technique, and
a generalized least squared (GLS) method with heteroscedastic errors are used to estimate
several specifications of skilled legal immigration. Results are presented in Tables 4.24.5. The fixed effect model is estimated to take into account the country-specific effects
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and it is assumed that country-specific effects vary systematically among the origin
countries. Destination-country fixed effect estimation is not possible since there is a
single destination in our sample. The incorporation of fixed effects causes a technical
problem when explanatory variables are invariant over time and within groups for which
a cross section panel is formed (Wooldridge, 2002). However, we do not have any
invariant explanatory variable in our model. The generalized least squared model with
heteroscedastic error allows variance for each of the panels to differ. We have different
countries in our sample, with dissimilar characteristics that make the application of the
GLS model with the heteroscedastic error structure appropriate.

The coefficient of the regressors can be interpreted as elasticities. For example, our
results infer that skilled legal immigration is elastic with respect to the population of the
destination. Results show that the origin country tariff rate is significant and has a
positive effect on skilled immigration. This implies that, with liberalization, the flow of
skilled legal immigration will decrease. As a consequence of liberalization, skilled
workers have better opportunities in their home country that reduces their incentive to
migrate. Population of the origin countries appears to have a significantly positive effect
on immigration. This is quite obvious, since growing population contributes positively to
the number of immigrants. GDP of the origin countries also plays an important role; as
with increasing GDP, legal immigration falls significantly.

With higher levels of

education in the origin countries, skilled legal immigration gets positive (significant)
stimulus. The unemployment rate of the origin country has a significantly negative effect
on legal immigration in the OLS estimation, whereas it is insignificant in fixed effect and

83

GLS estimation.

This might seem counter-intuitive.

However, if the economy is

characterized by dualism, then skilled workers may be employed at high industrial wages,
whereas there is unemployment in the entire economy. Hence, the skilled workers have
no incentive to migrate. This study is concerned only about the skilled workers and the
unemployment rate data does not reflect the true picture of unemployment among skilled
people. The difference between the skilled and unskilled U.S. wage turns out to be
insignificant in all regressions. Antidumping actions taken by the U.S. that act as nontariff barriers do not have any significant impact on our dependant variable. NAFTA and
Immigration Act dummies are significant in most regression results and where they are
significant they affect immigration positively. This implies that with the introduction of
NAFTA and the Immigration Act, skilled legal immigration has risen. The interaction
terms between the origin tariff rate and the NAFTA dummy and also the origin tariff rate
and the Immigration Act dummy are found to have positive and significant effects in
some of our estimated models. This implies that, once NAFTA and the Immigration Act
got into effect, the tariff rate of the origin country has a positive impact on immigration.
This makes the overall impact of the origin tariff rate more pronounced in the postNAFTA and Immigration Act periods.23

4.8 Summary and Conclusion

This study attempts to link trade liberalization to U.S. legal immigration. Based on legal
immigration from seven countries with different characteristics, we try to evaluate the
23

We also carry out a stepwise estmation.
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significance of the push factors in the origin nations for the flow of legal immigration.
Increasing liberalization has been found to impede the flow of legal immigration
significantly. This result is very robust across different estimated models. Growing
populations of the origin countries stimulate the flow of legal immigration. On the other
hand, a higher GDP at origin reduces the flow of legal immigration. NAFTA and the
Immigration Act also affect immigration positively. This throws light on the U.S.
immigration policy and North American trilateral trading arrangement. In short, we can
say that in order to keep legal immigration to a desired level, the U.S. should encourage
liberalization in the origin countries.

85

Table 4.2: OLS, Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation of the first model
Constant
Log of origin tariff rate
Log of destination tariff rate
Log of origin population
Log of destination population
Log of origin GDP
Log of destination GDP
Log of origin unemployment rate
Log of destination unemployment rate
Log of diff b/ween skilled & unskilled wage
in destination
Log of origin education
Immigration Act dummy
NAFTA dummy
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared

OLS
247.73
(750.68)
0.27***
(0.08)
0.17
(1.21)
0.17***
(0.06)
-8.87
(31.48)
-0.35***
(0.09)
-2.27
(7.9)
-0.24***
(0.07)
-0.54
(1.33)
1.50
(2.18)

Fixed Effect
450.61
(444.94)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.00
(0.71)
1.09***
(0.31)
-16.28
(18.6)
-0.76***
(0.23)
-4.39
(4.69)
-0.13
(0.14)
-0.74
(0.79)
0.68
(1.30)

GLS
250.6
(559.32)
0.17***
(0.06)
0.00
(0.89)
0.20***
(0.04)
-7.14
(23.4)
-0.35***
(0.06)
-3.49
(5.82)
-0.09
(0.06)
-0.91
(0.97)
1.31
(1.59)

0.75***
(0.20)
0.70**
(0.30)
0.80***
(0.21)
0.06
(0.41)
132
0.49

0.48
(0.37)
0.61***
(0.18)
0.48***
(0.13)
0.23
(0.24)
132
0.38

0.79***
(0.15)
0.53**
(0.22)
0.44**
(0.21)
0.09
(0.31)
132

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed in the parantheses
3. GLS model assumes heteroscedastic error structure.
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Table 4.3: OLS, Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation of the second model

Constant
Log of origin tariff rate
Log of destination tariff rate
Log of origin tariff rate×NAFTA dummy
Log of origin population
Log of destination population
Log of origin GDP
Log of destination GDP
Log of origin unemployment rate
Log of destination unemployment rate
Log of diff b/ween skilled & unskilled wage
in destination
Log of origin education
Immigration Act dummy
NAFTA dummy
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared

OLS
51.22
(723.26)
0.23***
(0.08)
0.15
(1.16)
1.06***
(0.32)
0.17***
(0.06)
-2.48
(30.29)
-0.34***
(0.08)
0.24
(7.62)
-0.18**
(0.07)
-0.09
(1.28)
0.91
(2.10)

Fixed Effect
384.43
(446.08)
0.10*
(0.05)
-0.01
(0.71)
0.28
(0.21)
1.11***
(0.31)
-13.97
(18.62)
-0.76***
(0.22)
-3.64
(4.71)
-0.14
(0.14)
-0.62
(0.79)
0.59
(1.30)

GLS
184.92
(504.56)
0.15***
(0.05)
-0.03
(0.80)
1.26***
(0.38)
0.20***
(0.04)
-4.63
(21.13)
-0.33***
(0.05)
-2.90
(5.24)
-0.04
(0.06)
-0.78
(0.88)
1.09
(1.43)

0.79***
(0.19)
0.55*
(0.29)
0.18
(0.27)
-0.04
(0.39)
132
0.53

0.40
(0.37)
0.58***
(0.18)
0.32*
(0.17)
0.19
(0.24)
132
0.38

0.82***
(0.14)
0.48**
(0.20)
-0.15
(0.25)
0.05
(0.28)
132

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
3. GLS model assumes heteroscedastic error structure.
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Table 4.4: OLS, Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation of the third model
Constant
Log of origin tariff rate
Log of destination tariff rate
Log of origin tariff rate×Immigration Act dummy
Log of origin population
Log of destination population
Log of origin GDP
Log of destination GDP
Log of origin unemployment rate
Log of destination unemployment rate
Log of diff b/ween skilled & unskilled wage
in destination
Log of origin education
Immigration Act dummy
NAFTA dummy
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared

OLS
153.77
(742.24)
0.28***
(0.08)
0.21
(1.20)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.14**
(0.06)
-5.06
(31.12)
-0.32***
(0.09)
-1.57
(7.8)
-0.25***
(0.07)
-0.46
(1.31)
1.49
(2.15)

Fixed Effect
416.87
(438.96)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.00
(0.7)
0.08**
(0.04)
0.84**
(0.33)
-14.35
(18.37)
-0.88***
(0.23)
-4.27
(4.63)
-0.11
(0.14)
-0.73
(0.78)
0.73
(1.28)

GLS
135.29
(541.99)
0.19***
(0.06)
0.05
(0.86)
0.10**
(0.04)
0.17***
(0.04)
-2.17
(22.69)
-0.32***
(0.05)
-2.82
(5.63)
-0.10
(0.06)
-0.87
(0.94)
1.30
(1.53)

0.71***
(0.2)
0.52*
(0.31)
0.92***
(0.21)
0.01
(0.4)
132
0.51

0.42
(0.36)
0.49***
(0.19)
0.53***
(0.13)
0.21
(0.24)
132
0.40

0.74***
(0.14)
0.35*
(0.23)
0.55***
(0.21)
0.02
(0.3)
132

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
3. GLS model assumes heteroscedastic error structure.
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Table 4.5: OLS, Fixed Effect and GLS Estimation of the fourth model
Constant
Log of origin tariff rate
Log of destination tariff rate
Log of antidumping actions by U.S.
Log of origin tariff rate×Immigration act dummy
Log of origin tariff rate×NAFTA dummy
Log of origin population
Log of destination population
Log of origin GDP
Log of destination GDP
Log of origin unemployment rate
Log of destination unemployment rate
Log of diff b/ween skilled & unskilled wage
in destination
Log of origin education
Immigration Act dummy
NAFTA dummy
Time
Number of observations
Adjusted R-squared

OLS
-92.03
(724.73)
0.25***
(0.08)
0.10
(1.16)
-0.11
(0.12)
0.09*
(0.05)
0.99***
(0.32)
0.15**
(0.06)
-1.45
(30.17)
-0.31***
(0.08)
4.41
(8.61)
-0.20***
(0.07)
0.74
(1.54)
1.10
(2.09)

Fixed Effect
317.23
(444.01)
0.11*
(0.05)
-0.05
(0.71)
-0.07
(0.07)
0.08*
(0.04)
0.24
(0.21)
0.84**
(0.33)
-13.65
(18.46)
-0.88***
(0.23)
-1.34
(5.27)
-0.13
(0.14)
-0.14
(0.94)
0.77
(1.29)

GLS
24.76
(485.87)
0.16***
(0.05)
-0.04
(0.77)
-0.10
(0.08)
0.09**
(0.04)
1.20***
(0.38)
0.17***
(0.04)
-1.83
(20.25)
-0.31***
(0.05)
0.69
(5.66)
-0.05
(0.06)
-0.10
(1.00)
1.27
(1.37)

0.75***
(0.19)
0.36
(0.31)
0.32
(0.28)
-0.16
(0.40)
132
0.60

0.38
(0.37)
0.44**
(0.19)
0.40**
(0.18)
0.14
(0.25)
132
0.41

0.77***
(0.13)
0.27
(0.21)
-0.01
(0.26)
-0.07
(0.27)
132

Note:
1. *, ** ,*** imply significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance respectively under a two -tailed
test
2. Standard errors are listed inside parentheses.
3. GLS model assumes heteroscedastic error structure.
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Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of the variables
Variable

Mean

Median

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Number of skilled legal
immigration
Origin tariff rate
(in percentage)
Destination tariff rate
(in percentage)
Number of Antidumping
actions by the U.S.
Origin population

14974

16761

9615

3451

63585

11.75

5.74

19.53

0.01

170.31

3.03

3.16

0.49

1.94

3.56

39

36

21

14

83

1.57e+08

5.39e+07

2.70e+08

3.82e+06

9.80e+08

2.49e+08
9.74

2.47e+08
8.10

1.44e+07
7.08

2.27e+08
2.00

2.75e+08
35.65

6.63

6.80

1.37

4.60

9.70

66.03

73.22

23.41

24.31

97.69

Destination population
Origin unemployment rate
(in percentage)
Destination
unemployment rate
(in percentage)
Origin education rate
(in percentage)
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Figure 4.2: Legal Immigrants

Legal Immigrants (FY 1980-1998)
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The abbreviation list for the countries are as follows:
PHL is the Philippines, MEX ix Mexico, KOR is Korea, IND is India, GBR is the United
Kingdom, ESD is El Salvador and CAN is Canada.
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Figure 4.3: Origin Tariff Rate for Selected Economies
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Figure 4.4: Origin Tariff Rate for Selected Economies
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Appendix

Per-country limit is the maximum number of family-sponsored and employment-based
preference visas that can be issued to the citizens of any country in a fiscal year. Between
FY 1980-1992 per country limit was 20,000. According to the Immigration Act of 1990,
per country limit was calculated each year from FY 1992 onward, depending on the total
number of family-sponsored and employment visas available. No more than 7% of the
visas can be issued to citizens of any independent country and no more than 2% can be
issued to any one dependency of any independent country. Generally, this limit set by the
INS is not strictly followed by each and every country. The limit may vary depending on
the number of applicants. Also, most countries do not reach the limit of maximum
number of visa issuance every year. Therefore, we do not consider the per-country limit in
our analysis.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Summary
Chapter 2 presents the first essay of the dissertation, analyzing the welfare effects of
transfers under bilateral and multilateral cases. It finds that under bilateral transfer,
immiserization cannot be ruled out if the recipient’s tax rate exceeds that of the nonparticipant. The study finds that multilateral transfers made in proportion to the exports
of the two exporting nations must raise A’s welfare, provided nation B has a sufficiently
small tax response. Multilateral transfers that are not proportional to the exports of the
recipient nations are likely to reduce the welfare of nation A, provided it receives a
smaller share of the total transfer. When equal transfers are made, asymmetry between
the recipients is found to play an important role for recipient immiserization. The study
finds that the nation imposing the higher tax rate is likely to be immiserized from equal
transfers. Hence, being more aggressive in taxation is a disadvantage in terms of gaining
from the receipts of transfer. The larger exporter exercises more market power and is also
more vulnerable to the adverse welfare effects of a transfer.

Several primary product-exporting nations employ export taxes. For example, nations
like Cote d’Ivoire and Brazil export cocoa and also employ export taxes. These taxes
may be imposed for various reasons, including raising tax revenues and/or improving
terms of trade. Clearly, the world cocoa price is dependent on the tax policies of each of
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these exporting nations and the trade policies of these nations are interdependent.24 In
reality, aid is provided simultaneously by the multilateral agencies to several primary
product- exporting, developing nations and these nations vary in terms of their market
share and export taxes.

Thus, asymmetry between exporting nations is crucial in

analyzing the effects of transfers.25 The first essay provides a framework for analyzing
these issues and finds interesting implications of asymmetry between exporting nations.
It suggests that in order to avoid undesirable outcomes, the interdependence and size of
nations should be considered in aid decisions by the donor agencies (or nations).

The second essay, in Chapter 3, finds that Mexican tariff rates have a significant effect on
illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S. Results show that as Mexico pursues trade
liberalization policies, the flow of illegal immigration from Mexico to the U.S. falls.
This is consistent with the Heckscher-Ohlin model. However, border patrol budget or
border patrol hours do not appear to have a significant impact on apprehension. The
finding is very interesting, because it suggests that trade policy may be a more effective
tool in controlling illegal immigration than immigration policy.

Traditional analysis of illegal immigration has focused on enforcement as the relevant
policy tool for controlling illegal immigration. The second essay focuses on the effects of
24

See Yilmaz (1999) for interesting institutional factors about the global cocoa market. He writes (page441): “...with 22percent market share in 1986, Brazil cannot ignore the reaction of Cote d’Ivoire, which had
a 29.5percent market share, while setting the export tax on cocoa.”

25

Analysis of asymmetry occupies an important place in the trade policy literature. See for example,
Kennan and Riezman (1988).
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trade liberalization on illegal immigration. While tariff liberalization by the source (or
origin) nation (say Mexico) may not be the policy tool of the host (or destination) nation
(e.g. the U.S.), it is often possible for the richer (and more powerful) host nation to
influence the source nation’s trade policy.
controlling illegal immigration.

This offers an alternate policy tool for

The empirical analysis establishes that trade

liberalization has significant effects on illegal immigration and helps to reduce the
problem.

The third essay, in Chapter 4 finds that the push factors in the origin countries that force
people to migrate, are very crucial for the level of legal immigration.

Increasing

liberalization has been found to impede the flow of legal immigration significantly.
Growing population of the origin countries is found to stimulate the flow of legal
immigration, whereas, a higher GDP at origin reduces the flow of legal immigration.
NAFTA and the Immigration Act also affect immigration positively. This throws light on
U.S. immigration policy and the North American trilateral trading arrangement. To
summarize, we can say that the instrument for curbing the flow of legal immigration is to
encourage liberalization in the origin countries. The key finding in this analysis is that
trade liberalization has significant dampening effects on the volume of legal immigration.
Hence, the empirical analysis of legal immigration in the third essay further strengthens
the case for using trade policy to control immigration.
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